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THE IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: A PRIMER FOR THE
PRACTITIONER
MICHAEL S. GILMORE
DALE D. GOBLE*
This article provides a comprehensive explanation and
analysis of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
adopted by the Idaho Legislature in 1992 and amended in
1993 before the original act's effective date of July 1, 1993. The
APA is a new beginning. Idaho administrative law has been
characterized too often by ad hoc procedures and unstructured
judicial review. The new APA is intended to remedy these
problems by creating a new and comprehensive statutory
structure. It will dramatically affect the state's agencies; many
will be required to completely revise their traditional way of
doing business.
Because the Act is a new beginning, a thorough explana-
tion is essential so that those affected by the Act - both the
state's administrative agencies and the public they serve -
will have a handy reference to the rights and obligations that
the Act creates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An administrative procedure act must specify the procedures
administrative agencies are to use and must prescribe the degree of
deference a reviewing court is to give to agency decisions on appeal.
In its first role, an administrative procedure act is like a constitution.
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It establishes the procedures an agency must employ to create
statute-like general standards (rules) or to impose judgment-like
directives and benefits (orders). By requiring agency decisionmakers
to comply with procedural norms of openness and rationality, the act
both creates procedural guarantees and limits agency discretion. In
its second role, the act structures and confines judicial review by
specifying standards for review of agency decisionmaking. This
ensures that, while agency action is bounded by procedural and
substantive law, the reviewing court does not intrude upon the
responsibilities the legislature has delegated to the agency. Both
roles reflect the conclusion that fair and open procedures, coupled
with a requirement that decisionmakers provide reasons for their
decisions, will produce better decisionmaking and better decisions.
While an administrative procedure act functions like a constitu-
tion in limiting agency discretion, it differs from a constitution
because it confers no substantive authority. The new Idaho Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA)' merely prescribes the procedural
limits on the exercise of authority delegated to an agency by another
statute. That is, when a statute authorizes an agency to promulgate
rules or decide contested cases, the APA specifies the procedures the
agency must employ to exercise the delegated powers. But the APA
does not itself authorize any agency to promulgate rules or to decide
contested cases.' There are two corollaries of this point. First, the
APA controls agency decisionmaking procedures only in the absence
of more specific statutory requirements.3 For example, if the statute
1. Codified at IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5201 to -5292 (Supp. 1993). Hereinafter,
all references to code sections are to the IDAHO CODE unless otherwise indicated.
2. An agency "has no authority other than that given to it by the
legislature." Washington Water Power Co. v. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 99 Idaho
875, 879, 591 P.2d 122, 126 (1979); see Hoppe v. Nichols, 100 Idaho 133, 137, 594
P.2d 643, 647 (1979) (agency hearing was not a "contested case" because the
agency lacked the statutory authority to enter orders); Pumice Prods., Inc. v.
Robison, 79 Idaho 144, 147, 312 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1957) (regulation not authorized
by statute is void); see also § 67-5231(1) ("Rules may be promulgated by an agency
only when specifically authorized by statute."). The court thus misspoke in a recent
case when it said that "[tihe adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . in
1965, served as a general statutory grant of rulemaking authority to administra-
tive agencies to promulgate rules." Rhodes v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Idaho Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1417, 1417 (1993). The 1965 APA codified procedures for rulemaking, but did
not authorize agency rulemaking.
3. APA procedures apply only to the extent that they are not inconsistent
with any procedural requirements in the statutes delegating the agency the
authority to promulgate rules and decide contested cases. In this, the APA is like
the common law: it is the background that is displaced by statutory law and
which fills in any gaps left by specific statutory law. See, e.g., Knight v.
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creating an agency requires it to hold a public hearing in all rule-
makings, the agency is required to comply with that statute as well
as the APA to the extent the APA is not inconsistent with the other
statute. This basic principle is reflected in the statute's recurrent
refrain: "unless prohibited by other provision of law."4 Second, the
APA is a floor rather than a ceiling: it establishes the minimum
procedures an agency must employ. The procedural rights it creates
are, therefore, in addition to other statutory and constitutional
rights.5
In addition to providing procedural guarantees and limiting
agency discretion, the drafters of the new APA also sought to imple-
ment three broad policy goals: opening up the administrative process
to increased public participation and scrutiny; regularizing agency
proceedings; and encouraging the use of informal, simple procedures
to the extent that informality and simplicity are consistent with
fundamental notions of fairness.
First, the drafters of the APA sought to open up administrative
decisionmaking by:
* requiring the Attorney General to promulgate standard rules of
procedure to be used by most state agencies.' This uniformity
means that a person will no longer be required to learn a.
different set of rules for each agency;
* requiring publication of all proposed rulemakings in the Idaho
Administrative Bulletin' and requiring notice of the proposals to
be published in newspapers throughout the state;
8
*** requiring the annual publication of an Idaho Administrative
Code that will contain the official text of all rules;9
Department of Ins., 119 Idaho 591, 592-93, 808 P.2d 1336, 1337-38 (Ct. App. 1991)
(de novo judicial review of agency action under separate statute).
4. The Act defines "provision of law" as "the whole or a part of the state or
federal constitution, or of any state or federal: (a) statute; or (b) rule or decision of
court." § 67-5201(14); see also infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing
the term "provision of law").
5. Cf Mills v. Swanson, 93 Idaho 279, 281, 460 P.2d 704, 706 (1969)
("[Tihe legislature by the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . did not
intend to abolish those methods of review already in existence."); see also Briggs v.
Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427, 433, 546 P.2d 382, 388 (1976)
(quoting Mills, 93 Idaho at 281, 460 P.2d at 706).
6. § 67-5206(2)-(5).
7. § 67-5203.
8. § 67-5221(2).
9. § 67-5204.
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*** expanding the opportunities for public comment" and
continuing to require agencies to consider that comment;"
*** providing greater opportunities for legislative comment during
the rulemaking process; 2
*** requiring agencies to state the reasons for decisions on the
content of rules; 3
*** requiring agencies to state the reasons for accepting or rejecting
public and legislative comments on proposed rules; 4
*** requiring agencies to compile a more complete record of the
information considered in a notice-and-comment rulemaking;"
*** reducing variations among agency procedures for contested
cases;'
*** requiring agencies to index and make available the decision in
any contested case that the agency proposes to rely upon in
future cases;
7
*** requiring agencies to index and make available all agency
guidance documents such as manuals, memoranda, policy
statements, and legal interpretations;"
authorizing judicial review of agency rulemakings, contested
cases, and other actions taken pursuant to a statutory duty. 9
Second, the Act regularizes agency proceedings by reducing the
variety of procedures that agencies may employ and by restricting
agency discretion:
*** rulemakings are systematized by requiring agencies to comply
with time schedules tied into the publication of the
Administrative Bulletin; 0
*** the wide variety of agency contested case procedures are reduced
to four basic types and the procedures for each are specified;2'
10. § 67-5222.
11. § 67-5224.
12. § 67-5223.
13. § 67-5224(2).
14. Id.
15. § 67-5225.
16. §§ 67-5242 to -5246.
17. § 67-5250(1).
18. § 67-5250(2).
19. § 67-5270.
20. §§ 67-5222 to -5224.
21. §§ 67-5242 to -5247.
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*** the Attorney General has promulgated a set of standard
procedural rules that control the procedures before most
agencies;"
*** the procedural requirements for judicial review and the
standards applicable on review are specified in greater detail.23
Finally, the Act seeks to retain simplicity and informality while
ensuring that agency decisionmaking comports with fundamental
notions of fairness. Idaho's administrative agencies range from fully
professionalized larger agencies to small, citizen-staffed boards. The
APA attempts to keep procedures as simple as possible both for the
agency and the public. It encourages -informal dispute resolution:
*** through negotiated rulemakings in which all parties seek a
consensus on the content of a rule;24
• through informal resolution of contested cases. 5
The new APA thus significantly modernizes the procedures that
govern the state's administrative agencies.- It will require a dramatic
change in the decisionmaking of many state agencies.
II. GENERAL PROVISIONS
The APA is divided into five parts. The first - §§ 67-5201 to 67-
5207 - contains general provisions applicable to the remainder of
the APA. This part also creates a new office, the Office of Adminis-
trative Rules Coordinator to oversee the publication of the Adminis-
trative Bulletin and the Administrative Code.
A. Section 67-5201: Definitions
Section 67-5201 contains a series of interlocking definitions that
apply throughout the remainder of the Act. While definitions are
always crucial to understanding a statute, this is particularly true
under the APA because of the pervasiveness of terms such as
"agency," "rule," and "order" in state government. The new definitions
will require some agencies to rename the various types of documents
they issue. For example, the Department of Fish and Game and the
Public Utilities Commission will no longer be able to issue "rules"
22. § 67-5206.
23. §§ 67-5271 to -5279.
24. § 67-5220(2).
25. § 67-5241.
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through "orders" because the documents to which these terms now
refer are produced through mutually exclusive procedures.
1. "Agency"
One key to the Act's goal of procedural uniformity is the defini-
tion of "agency." The term is defined as "each state board, commis-
sion, department, or officer authorized by law to make rules or to
determine contested cases."2" Given the definitions of "rule"27 and
"contested case,"28 all state entities that are empowered to affect an
individual's legal rights, duties, or privileges fall within the definition
and are covered by the Act. Given the broad policy goal of regular-
izing agency decisionmaking, and the fact that the APA's procedural
restrictions apply only to "agencies," the courts should include any
state entity exercising governmental authority as an "agency," thus
bringing it within the confines of the Act.29
While the definition is broad, it nonetheless excludes two general
categories of governmental entities. First, in a surfeit of caution, the
definition explicitly exempts "the legislative or judicial branches,
executive officers listed in section 1, article IV, of the constitution of
the state of Idaho in the exercise of powers derived directly and
exclusively from the constitution, the state militia or the state board
of correction." ° Good grounds clearly exist for exempting both the
legislature and the judiciary since each is bound by procedures
unique to that branch of government. The exclusion of executive
26. § 67-5201(2).
27. "[T]he whole or a part of an agency statement of general applicability."
§ 67-5201(16).
28. "[A] proceeding which results in the issuance of an order." § 67-5201(6);
" 'Order' means an agency action of particular applicability that determines the
legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one (1) or
more specific persons." § 67-5201(11).
29. For this reason, the decision in Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122
Idaho 471, 479-80, 835 P.2d 1282, 1290-91 (1992), that the Idaho State Building
Authority is not an "agency" is superceded by the new APA. The Authority is an
"agency" under the APA's definition of that term because the legislature has
empowered the Authority to "adopt and from time to time amend and repeal by-
laws and rules and regulations . . . to carry into effect the powers and purposes of
the authority and the conduct of its business." § 67-6409(e) (emphasis added).
30. § 67-5201(2). Article IV, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides in
relevant part: "The executive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant
governor, secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer, attorney general and
superintendent of public instruction." IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 1. On the exclusion
of the State Board of Corrections, see Carman v. State Comm'n of Pardons &
Parole, 119 Idaho 642, 809 P.2d 503 (1991).
1993-94]
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officers exercising constitutional functions was arguably unnecessary
since such officers are not "authorized by law to make rules or to
determine contested cases" when acting exclusively within their
constitutional powers.3 An explicit exclusion of such officers is,
nonetheless, justifiable on at least two grounds. First, principles of
separation of powers limit the legislature's authority to control the
exercise of constitutional functions by officers in the other branches
of government.32 Second, the functions constitutionally vested in
executive officers are ordinarily political and thus subject to political
rather than judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, the exclusion is a narrow
one. It is limited to the officers themselves and does not include "the
office of" such officers. For example, if the legislature places a
governmental entity within "the office of the governor," it is an
"agency" under the APA if it otherwise meets the definition by being
authorized to promulgate rules or decide contested cases. Similarly,
functions assigned directly to these officers by statute fall within the
definition of "agency" to the extent that they authorize rulemaking or
contested case proceedings.
The second exclusion is for agencies established by counties,
municipalities, and other local governing bodies; only units at the
state level of government are "agencies" under. the APA's
definition.34 At the same time, the division of the APA into five
parts was intended to facilitate the application of individual parts of
the Act to local governing bodies when the legislature chooses to do
so. 5 Thus, while local governmental agencies are not automatically
covered by the APA, the Act has been structured to facilitate
extension of its provisions to local decisionmakers.
Given the breadth of the definitions of the crucial terms and the
narrow scope of the exclusions, all state executive entities - other
than constitutional officers - empowered to take actions that affect
the legal rights, duties, or other interests of members of the public
31. § 67-5201(2) (emphasis added).
32. "The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." IDAHO
CONST. art. II, § 1.
33. See, e.g., State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, 97 Idaho 791, 804, 554 P.2d 969,
982 (1976).
34. " 'Agency' means each state board, commission, department or
officer . ... " § 67-5201(2) (emphasis added).
35. E.g., § 67-6521(d) (local zoning decisions are subject to judicial review
under APA).
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are within the confines of the new APA.36 The courts, therefore,
should require all state agencies to comply with the APA except when
it is explicitly made inapplicable and should narrowly construe
-exceptions to promote the Act's overriding goal of procedural
uniformity among all state agencies.
2. "Agency Head"
"Agency head" is defined to mean the "individual or body of in-
dividuals in whom the ultimate legal authority of the agency is
vested by any provision of law."37 This definition differentiates the
"agency" as a unit that includes all employees from the "agency head"
as the particular individuals with final legal authority for the
decisions of that unit. The term is of primary importance in the
contested case procedures where the agency head generally has final
legal authority to issue an order.3'
Under the definition, different individuals or bodies within the
same agency may be the "agency head" for different functions. If the
legislature assigns certain functions to one officer and other functions
to another, each is the agency head for the particular function for
which the officer has final legal authority. For example, the Depart-
ments of Health and Welfare, Water Resources, and Fish and Game
each have a director who is the agency head for some purposes, and
boards or commissions that are the agency head for others. s
3. "Agency Action," "Order," "Rule," "Contested Case,"
and "Rulemaking"
Section 67-5201 contains three definitions that divide the range
of possible agency decisionmaking actions into three categories:
"orders," "rules," and other "dut[ies] placed on [an agency] by law."
This division is enumerated in the definition of "agency action" as
36. There is also -a limited exclusion of the Public Utilities Commission and
the Industrial Commission. These agencies are explicitly excluded from the APA's
provisions on contested cases, § 67-5240, and judicial review of contested cases, §
67-5270(3). This exclusion was necessitated by the special constitutional status of
these two agencies. See IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 9. The rulemaking provisions of
the Act are, however, fully applicable to both agencies - which is consistent with
the goal of procedural uniformity since exemptions are drawn as narrowly as
possible.
37. § 67-5201(4).
38. See §§ 67-5243 to -5246; see also infra notes 245-47 and accompanying
text (distinguishing "agency head," "presiding officer," and "hearing officer").
39. See §§ 39-104, -107 (Health & Welfare); §§ 36-101, -102 (Fish & Game);
§§ 42-1701, -1732 (Water Resources).
1993-94] 283
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"(a) the whole or part of a rule or order;
"(b) the failure to issue a rule or order; or
"(c) the agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any duty
placed on it by law."4 °
The first two types of actions - orders and rules - are the
more important because they are the two primary ways in which an
agency can change legal rights and duties of individuals outside the
agency. "Order" means "an agency action of particular applicability
that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or
other legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons."4" A "rule,"
on the other hand, is "an agency statement of general applicability
that has been promulgated in compliance with the provisions of' the
APA "and that implements, interprets, or prescribes: (a) law or
policy, or (b) the procedure or practice requirements of an agency."42
The distinction thus turns primarily on applicability: orders - like
judicial decrees - affect identified parties; rules - like statutes -
affect classes of persons.
The number of affected individuals is in itself not necessarily
conclusive: a rule may apply to a class of one. For example, an envi-
ronmental protection rule might apply to only a single plant if there
were only one such plant in the state.' Similarly, as the Snake
River adjudication is demonstrating, judicial decisionmaking may
affect a large number of parties.
The distinction between adjudicative and legislative decision is
central to the APA because it determines whether the agency is
required to employ the "contested case"44 procedures or may instead
rely upon the less procedurally demanding "rulemaking"
45
requirements. Ultimately, of course, the distinction is bottomed on
the one drawn by the United States Supreme Court in Londoner v.
40. § 67-5201(3). Two additional points should be noted. First, the principal
effect of this broad definition of "agency action" is found in the Act's judicial
review provisions. See § 67-5270. Second, "agency action" is defined to include the
failure to act. § 67-5201(3)(b)-(c). An agency thus may not evade judicial review by
simply doing nothing. See generally infra notes 410-11 and accompanying text
(discussing judicial review of agency inaction).
41. § 67-5201(11) (emphasis added).
42. § 67-5201(16) (emphasis added).
43. E.g., Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1306 (10th Cir. 1973).
44. " 'Contested case' means a proceeding which results in the issuance of an
order." § 67-5201(6). The contested case procedures are set out at §§ 67-5240 to
-5255.
45. " 'Rulemaking' means the process for formulation, adoption, amendment
or repeal of a rule." § 67-5201(17). The rulemaking procedures are contained in
§§ 67-5220 to -5232.
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Denver46 and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equal-
ization:47 contested case procedures are constitutionally required
only where a "small number of persons ... [are] exceptionally
affected.., upon individual grounds"; 4 rulemaking procedures, on
the other hand, may be employed "[wihere a rule of conduct applies
to more than a few people."49 The distinction mirrors that between
legislative and judicial decisionmaking. The Idaho APA restates this
fundamental proposition - that the state may affect an individual on
individual grounds only by providing that person with notice and an
individualized hearing, but may affect classes of persons without
such individualized hearings - in its definitions of "order" and
"rule."
The definition of "rule" raises three additional points. First, an
agency statement is a "rule" only if it has been promulgated in
compliance with rulemaking procedures. That is, a "rule" is "an
agency statement of general applicability that has been promulgated
in compliance with the provisions of this chapter."" As the comment
to the definition notes, "It]he limitation on agency statements that
are 'rules' is procedural rather than substantive: an agency may
promulgate a rule only by complying with the procedure set out in
the Administrative Procedure Act."5 Thus, a statement by an
agency - regardless of its appellation and even if it interprets law or
prescribes policy - is not a "rule" unless it has been promulgated in
compliance with the procedures set out in the APA.
The second and corollary point is that, if the statement is not a
"rule," it does not have the force and effect of law.5" In other words,
46. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
47. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
48. Id. at 446; cf United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244
(1973) ("The basic distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is illustrated by
this Court's treatment of' Londoner and Bi-Metallic.).
49. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445.
50. § 67-5201(16) (emphasis added).
51. § 67-5201 cmt. 16.
52. See, e.g., Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho __ , 864 P.2d 132, 137 (1993);
Bingham Memorial Hosp. v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 108 Idaho 346, 347,
699 P.2d 1360, 1361 (1985) (per curiam); Minidoka Memorial Hosp. v. Idaho Dep't
of Health & Welfare, 108 Idaho 344, 345-46, 699 P.2d 1358, 1359-60 (1985) (per
curiam). Similarly, the four categories of statements specifically exempted from the
Act's definition of "rule" do not have the force and effect of law on the general
public. Those categories are:
(i) statements concerning only the internal management or internal
personnel policies of an agency and not affecting private rights of the
public or procedures available to the public; or
(ii) declaratory rulings issued pursuant to section 67-5232, Idaho Code; or
1993-94]
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if the agency desires to adopt a "statement... that... pre-
scribes ... law,"53 it must comply with the APA's rulemaking
procedures: "If the agency has not complied with these requirements,
it has not promulgated a 'rule' and the statement lacks the force and
effect of law. If an agency wishes to impose legal obligations on a
class of persons, it must promulgate a rule."54 The benefit that an
agency gains from complying with the procedures necessary to
promulgate a rule is that the rule is an independently binding legal
requirement. If an agency does not comply with the necessary
procedures, it has not created a "rule"; if the agency attempts to
apply a legal interpretation or a policy statement that has not been
promulgated as a rule, the issue is not whether the person's conduct
violated that statement, but whether the conduct violated the
underlying statute.55 As a result of these requirements, a large
number of documents that agencies have traditionally given the force
and effect of law will cease to have that status unless they are
repromulgated as rules.56
(iii) intra-agency memoranda; or
(iv) any written statements given by an agency which pertain to an
interpretation of a rule or to the documentation of compliance with a rule.
§ 67-5201(16)(b).
53. § 67-5201(16) (emphasis added).
54. § 67-5201 cmt. 16; see also Service Employees Int'l Union v. Idaho Dep't
of Health & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 758-59, 683 P.2d 404, 406-07 (1984) (agency
manual that had not been promulgated as a rule did not create legal rights or
responsibilities).
55. E.g., Curr, 124 Idaho at __, 864 P.2d at 137. (agency "letter of
understanding" not promulgated as a rule "lends no support to the Commission's
claimed authority.").
56. These two points can be clarified by looking at a recent Idaho Supreme
Court case decided under the former APA. Tomorrow's Hope, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of
Health & Welfare, 124 Idaho __, 864 P.2d 1130 (1993), involved a controversy
over Medicare payments for mentally retarded individuals living in an intermediate
care facility. Id. at __, 864 P.2d at 1131-32. Under the Medicare program,
payments for most services are computed as a percentage of the provider's total
costs of providing the service. Id. The statute, however, requires certain costs -
those "peculiar" to the care of mentally retarded individuals - to be fully
reimbursed. Id. Thus, the more costs determined to be peculiar to caring for
mentally retarded persons, the greater the payment the care provider receives. The
agency had previously promulgated a rule defining the fully reimbursable costs to
be the "direct care costs" of mentally retarded residents. Id. In response to
requests for additional guidance from its auditors on what costs were properly
"direct care costs," the agency issued a memorandum construing such costs to
include only "hands-on" services. Id.
The care provider sought review of the agency's disallowance of certain
costs that it believed were "direct care costs" under the rule; the agency
contended, on the other hand, that they were not "hands-on" costs and thus were
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It is crucial that courts require agencies to comply with the
APA's procedural requirements when they seek to affect individuals.
An agency that attempts to enforce compliance with statements that it
has not promulgated as a rule under the APA's rulemaking provisions
should be assessed costs in any resulting judicial action since the
agency "acted without a reasonable basis in ... law.""
The third point that is implicit in the definition of "rule" is that
an agency must comply with its own rules. Since validly promulgated
rules have the force and effect of law, the agency like the public must
comply with rules.5" Thus, an agency may give its general state-
ments of policy the force and effect of law only by promulgating them
not reimbursable. Id. The court viewed the issue to be whether the hands-on
policy "amounted to a fundamental, significant change in [the] interpretation" of
the statutory language or is "merely a refinement of, and is essentially consistent
with," the agency's earlier amplification of the statutory language in its rule. Id. at
__ 864 P.2d at 1132. The court believed that this inquiry was controlling
because "an interpretation of the statutory term 'peculiar' " could be accomplished
only through a rulemaking, while an interpretation "of the regulatory term 'direct
care costs' " would exempt from the requirement that it be adopted as a rule. Id.
The court acknowledged that attempts to distinguish between "interpretations" and
'redefinitions" created a "difficult problem," but concluded that this was the task
assigned to the court by the former APA. Id. at __, 864 P.2d at 1133.
Under the new APA, courts will not be required to engage in such
chimerical searches. The hands-on policy is not a "rule" under the new APA's
definition of the term because it was not promulgated in compliance with the Act's
rulemaking procedures. The policy therefore does not have the force and effect of
law and the issue before the court under the new APA would be whether the
disputed cost items were "direct care costs" rather than whether they were "hands-
on" costs. This would be the issue because the care provider is required to comply
with the law - that is, the rule - rather than with the agency's interpretation of
that law. Unlike the old APA as construed in Tomorrow's Hope, the hands-on
policy will not be given the force and effect of law: it will merely be the agency's
interpretation of what "direct care costs" means. While an agency's interpretation
of its rules is entitled to deference from a reviewing court, the reviewing court
must determine whether the agency's disallowance of the disputed costs was
consistent with the rule. The crucial point is: the reviewing court's focus is shifted
from distinguishing between "interpretations" and "redefinitions" to the type of
question that courts have traditionally answered: are specific disputed cost items
"direct care costs" within a statutory-type statement of general norms.
A final point: under the new APA the term "interpretive rule" is an
oxymoron. There are interpretations and there are rules, but an agency statement
is one or the other since an interpretation that is promulgated as a "rule" is a
rule; and interpretations that are not promulgated as rules are only
interpretations.
57. § 12-117(1). Courts should be particularly vigilant to prevent an agency
from obtaining the legal benefits of promulgating rules without complying with the
procedural requirements since such actions undercut the APA's safeguards.
58. E.g., Hoppe v. Nichols, 100 Idaho 133, 137, 594 P.2d 643, 647 (1979).
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in compliance with the APA's procedural requirements; when it does
so, the rules are binding on both the public and the agency itself.59
Agencies, of course, do many things in addition to promulgating
rules and issuing orders. Some of these actions carry out duties
imposed on the agency by a statutory or judicial mandate. When the
agency complies or fails to comply with such a duty, its conduct is
"agency action." 0 Extending judicial review to such agency actions
is a significant change in the new APA. For example, the Department
of Transportation is required by statute to adopt "a uniform system
of traffic-control devices" that conform to federal standards61 and to
ensure that such devices are installed where appropriate. 2 If the
Department failed to install a speed limit sign near a school play-
ground, this would be an agency action because it would be a "failure
to perform, [a] duty placed on it by law." 3 A reviewing court may, of
course, conclude that the substantive law does not in fact require a
speed limit sign and the agency would prevail on the merits.
Nonetheless, the APA creates a procedural right to have a court
review the merits of the agency's decision.'
Stating the point from a different perspective: decisions that are
totally discretionary, that involve no duty are not "agency actions"
subject to judicial review. There are, however, few agency decisions
59. It is useful to remember three caveats to these principles. First, the APA
confers no substantive authority on an agency. Thus, an agency must be delegated
the power to promulgate rules by a statute other than the APA. See § 67-5231(1).
Second, the APA also does not.confer discretion on an agency: if a statute requires
an agency to promulgate rules, the APA does not allow the agency to evade its
statutory duty. The APA's definition of "rule," in other words, does not grant
discretion to avoid rulemaking. Third, the APA's procedural requirements for
rulemakings apply only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any
procedural requirements contained in the statute delegating the agency power to
promulgate rules. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. These three
caveats are variations on two general principles: an agency is a creature of statute
that possesses only the authority delegated to it by a statute and the APA is not
a delegation of substantive authority.
60. § 67-5201(3)(c) (" 'Agency action' means: ... (c) an agency's performance
of, or failure to perform, any duty placed on it by law.").
61. § 49-201(3).
62. § 49-201; see also Bingham v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 117 Idaho 147,
150-51, 786 P.2d 538, 541-42 (1990) (implementation of statutory requirements not
discretionary).
63. § 67-5201(3)(c).
64. As a comment to the APA states, the Act expands the range of agency
decisions subject to judicial- review. § 67-5201 cmt. 3. At the same time, "[it is
important to distinguish between availability of review and likelihood of success on
the merits. The Act limits the scope of judicial review rather than precluding
review of agency actions." Id.
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that are totally discretionary since statutes commonly hedge in
administrative discretion by specifying standards or requiring find-
ings. In such cases, the rationality of the agency's decision on the
findings or other statutory limits will be subject to judicial review.
4. "Party" and "Person"
An additional pair of terms are related to the APA's distinction
between adjudicative, record-based decisions and legislative, not-
record-based decisions. Under the Act, a "party" is "each person or
agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and
entitled as of right to be admitted as a party" in a contested case. 5
A "person," on the other hand, is "any individual, partnership, corp-
oration, association, governmental subdivision or agency, or public or
private organization or entity of any character.""
5. "Provision of Law"
A phrase that recurs repeatedly in the APA is "other provision of
law.""7 The Act defines the phrase broadly: " 'Provision of law'
means the whole or a part of the state or federal constitution, or of
any state or federal: (a) statute; or (b) rule or decision of court."'
This reflects the basic proposition that the APA's provisions are
applicable only in the absence of other legal requirements. Thus, if a
statute requires that an agency's decisions be reviewed de novo, that
requirement overrides the inconsistent provisions for appellate
review in the APA.69
65. § 67-5201(12). The Attorney General's Rules define eight categories of
parties in addition to the agency: applicants, claimants, appellants, petitioners,
complainants, respondents, protestants, and intervenors. See IDAHO R. ADMIN. P.
150-156, 93-1 IDAHO ADMIN. BULL. at 04-62 (to be codified at IDAPA 04.11.0100 to
.0199). Under the numbering system for rules, Attorney General Rule 550 is
IDAPA 04.11.01550 (emphasis added). Hereinafter, citations to the Attorney
General's procedural rules will be to "IRAP ." See IRAP 6.
66. § 67-5201(13). The Attorney General's Rules recognize that "persons" may
potentially be interested in some types of agency proceedings even though they are
not parties to the proceedings. See IRAP 158, 355.
67. See, e.g., §§ 67-5240, -5241, -5270, -5272, -5273, -5279.
68. § 67-5201(14).
69. E.g., Hart v. Stewart, 95 Idaho 781, 784, 519 P.2d 1171, 1174 (1974);
Knight v. Department of Ins., 119 Idaho 591, 593, 808 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Ct. App.
1991).
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B. Sections 67-5202 to 67-5205: Publication of Agency Rules
In 1980 the legislature amended the Administrative Procedure
Act to ensure that agency rules would be generally available to the
public.70 The amendment required each agency to send copies of its
rules to twenty-five designated libraries throughout the state.
Anecdotal evidence that the system was not working was confirmed
in a 1991 study by the Idaho State Library. The report found that
the publication system "fails in its primary objective of providing
broad public access to a complete, current, and uniform set of
rules."71 The study found that the major problem was "the absence
of any control,"72 which was traceable to the lack of a centralized
administration or coordination of the distribution system.73 The
report concluded: "Any modification or major change in the distri-
bution system should include some degree of centralized admini-
stration or coordination .... Merely tinkering with the existing
system is short-sighted and will not ensure that the public has
convenient access to complete, current, and uniform sets of rules."74
Responding to the report's criticisms and recommendations, the
new APA establishes a centralized publication system overseen by
the new Office of Administrative Rules Coordinator.75 The Rules
Coordinator is responsible for the production of the two publications
established by the Act, the Idaho Administrative Bulletin76 and the
Idaho Administrative Code.7' The Coordinator is also responsible for
ensuring uniformity in agency rules, and therefore is delegated
70. Act of Mar. 14, 1980, ch. 78, § 1, 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws 160 (formerly
codified at § 67-5205) (requiring each agency to provide enumerated libraries with
complete sets of rules); see also Williams v. State, 95 Idaho 5, 9, 501 P.2d 203,
207 (1972) ("[Unless the administrative agency furnishes copies to each of the
respective law libraries, its rules and regulations are without force and effect.").
71. Karin E. Ford & Carol A. Silvers, Idaho State Library, The Distribution
to Idaho Libraries of Administrative Procedure Act Rules 5 (1991) (copy on file
with Professor Dale D. Goble, University of Idaho College of Law).
72. Id.
73. Insufficient personnel and funds to keep the rules current also
contributed to the problems. Id.
74. Id.
75. § 67-5202. The Rules Coordinator is located within the office of the State
Auditor and is to be appointed by the Auditor "with the advice and consent of the
senate." Id.
76. § 67-5203.
77. § 67-5204.
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authority to promulgate rules establishing a uniform numbering,
style, and format for agency rules.7"
The Idaho Administrative Bulletin, a publication modeled on the
Federal Register, is to be published at least monthly."9 The Bulletin
will cohtain the various documents required for an agency
rulemaking, and its publication schedule is therefore tied into the
time limits provided in the rulemaking provisions of the APA. For
example, it is publication in the Bulletin that initiates the time limits
applicable to the stages of a rulemaking.1 In addition to agency
rulemaking documents, the Bulletin will contain "any legislative
documents affecting a final agency rule" and "all proclamations and
executive orders of the governor." 2
While the Bulletin will be the primary method of providing
notice to the public of proposed rulemakings, the Rules Coordinator is
also required to publish a brief notice of proposed rules in local
newspapers.' The APA substantially expands the number of news-
papers in which notice is to be published and increases the visibility
of the notice by moving it out of the legal notices section. The
newspaper notice directs interested persons to locations where the
full text of the proposed rule can be found in the Bulletin.
The second new publication is the Idaho Administrative Code.'
The Code is modelled on the Code of Federal Regulations and is to be
an annual codification of all final agency rules, any legislative
documents affecting such rules, and all gubernatorial proclamations
and orders.85 The Code will contain the text of all previously codified
78. §§ 67-5202, -5206(1).
79. The Rules Coordinator is also authorized to promulgate rules establishing
publication schedules for the Bulletin and the Code. § 67-5206(1). The authority to
do so is, however, limited by § 67-5203(1) which requires publication "not less
frequently than the first Wednesday of each calendar month, but not more
frequently than every other week." § 67-5203(1).
80. These documents may include a Notice of Intent to Promulgate a Rule, §
67-5220, Notice of a Proposed Rulemaking, § 67-5221, and Final Rule, § 67-5224.
The information to be included in these documents is set out in the respective
sections. -
81. See §§ 67-5220 to -5228.
82. § 67-5203(4). This list is not exhaustive since the legislature may require
additional classes of documents to be published in the Bulletin. On the other hand,
matters internal to an agency or to the government are generally not to be
published. Cf. § 67-5201(16) (defining "rule" to exclude "statements concerning.only
the internal management or internal personnel policies of an agency and not
affecting private rights of the public or procedures available to the public").
83. § 67-5221(2).
84. § 67-5204.
85. § 67-5204(2).
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rules that remain in effect as well as the text of all new final rules
published in the Bulletin during the preceding year."
The new system should rectify distribution problems that
plagued the previous system by making a complete set of rules
available in each county law library.87 Furthermore, since "[t]he text
of all documents published in the bulletin shall be the official text of
that document until the document has been published in the
administrative code,""8 an individual will be able to determine
conclusively the content of the current permanent rules by examining
the Code, a quarterly cumulative index, and no more than three
months' Bulletins.ss
The new publication system is one of several provisions in the
Act intended to prevent the creation of "secret law" and to provide
greater certainty on the public's legal rights and responsibilities.
There is nothing as injurious to the concept of the rule of law as a
system that hides the law. The Bulletin and the Code will remove one
possible source of inadvertent secrecy.90
C. Section 67-5206: Promulgation of Rules Implementing the
Administrative Procedure Act
The Idaho APA, like its federal counterpart, does not specify
procedural minutiae such as a numbering system for agency rules,
the format and content requirements for various filings, and the like.
Leaving such matters to each agency, however, would have produced
disparate requirements and frustrated the desired administrative
86. Id.
87. § 67-5205(2).
88. § 67-5203(5); cf § 67-5204(3) ("The text of all documents published in the
administrative code shall be the official text of that document.").
89. Section 67-5203(3) requires a cumulative index to the Bulletin to be
published at least every three months. The only exception to these publication
requirements is for "temporary rules," a limited category of rules that may take
effect immediately upon their transmittal to the Rules Coordinator without
awaiting their publication in the Bulletin. See § 67-5226(1) ("The agency may make
the temporary rule immediately effective."). "Temporary rules shall be published in
the first available issue of the bulletin." § 67-5226(3). See generally infra notes
150-57 and accompanying text (discussing temporary rules).
90. The secrecy was frequently inadvertent because the prior law, by denying
legal effect to rules that were not available in enumerated libraries, created a
strong incentive for agencies to comply with publication requirements. See Act of
Mar. 14, 1980, ch. 78, § 1, 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws 160 (formerly codified at § 67-
5205); Williams v. State, 95 Idaho 5, 9, 501 P.2d 203, 207 (1972). The designated
libraries, however, often lacked sufficient staff to keep the rules current. See supra
notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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uniformity. As a compromise, the Act delegates to the Rules
Coordinator and the Attorney General the power to promulgate
uniform rules to cover such matters. Thus, the Rules Coordinator is
authorized to promulgate rules establishing a uniform numbering,
style, and format for agency rules.9 The Attorney General is
delegated broader responsibility to prepare a set of procedural rules
for use by state agencies.9 2 The Attorney General's rules are to
specify the more detailed standards, forms, and procedures necessary
to implement the rulemaking and contested case procedures set out
in the Act.
93
To further the goal of administrative uniformity, the Act
provides that the Attorney General's rules will apply to "to all
agencies that do not affirmatively promulgate alternative proce-
dures."9 ' Any agency desiring to adopt procedural rules different
from those promulgated by the Attorney General must include in its
rulemaking "a finding that states the reasons why the relevant
portion of the attorney general's rules were inapplicable to the
agency under the circumstances."95 Furthermore, the Attorney
General's rules are intended to establish the minimum procedural
requirements. Agencies seeking to be excluded from coverage of the
Attorney General's rules are expected to meet their minimum
requirements. The mandate that an agency must affirmatively act to
exempt itself from the Attorney General's rule was to encourage
uniformity by enlisting the power of inertia.
The Attorney General's Rules of Procedure were promulgated on
July 1, 1993, in the first edition of the Idaho Administrative
Bulletin. '
91. §§ 67-5202, -5206(1).
92. § 67-5206(2).
93. See §§ 67-5206(3)-(4) (specifying the subjects to be covered by the rules).
94. § 67-5206(5)(a).
95. § 67-5206(5)(b). The larger agencies that need specialized procedures have
promulgated their own rules. They have, however, generally followed the Attorney
General's Rules in format and content. See, e.g., IDAPA 31.01.01000 (Public
Utilities Commission rules); IDAPA 37.01.01000 (Department of Water Resources
rules).
96. 93-1 IDAHO ADMIN. BULL. at 04-62 (1993) (to be codified at IDAPA
04.11.0100 to .0199).
The Attorney General's Rules and the APA have been published in
pamphlet form by the Attorney General and are available from the Office of the
Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720. The cost is $15 per copy.
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III. DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES
The second and third parts of the APA - §§ 67-5220 to 67-5232
and §§ 67-5240 to 67-5255 - specify the procedures that an agency
must employ to take the two types of agency actions that affect the
rights and duties- of private individuals: promulgating rules and
deciding contested cases.
A. Rules and Rulemaking
When an agency is engaged in rulemaking it is acting in a
legislative capacity and the process constitutionally due does not
include an individualized hearing.17 The comparatively minimal due
process requirements increase the importance of statutory proce-
dures. These statutory procedures are contained in §§ 67-5220 to 67-
5232.
1. Section 67-5220: Negotiated Rulemaking
One of the goals of the APA is to encourage the use of informal
procedures. This goal is reflected in the authority delegated to
agencies to publish a Notice of Intent to Promulgate Rules." This
notice - "a brief, nontechnical statement of the subject matter to be
addressed in the proposed rulemaking"" - will alert potentially
interested persons that an agency is considering promulgating rules
before the agency has committed itself to specific language. Involving
the interested public at an early stage is intended to "facilitate
negotiated rulemaking."10 0
97. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915). The Supreme Court stated:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is
impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption.
The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town
meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state
power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals .. .
without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in
the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power,
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.
Id.; see supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction
between legislative and adjudicative decisions).
98. § 67-5220; see also IRAP 800, 810-15; cf § 67-5241 & cmt. 3 (encourag-
ing informal dispute resolution).
99. § 67-5220(1); see also IRAP 812 (specifying content of Notice of Intent to
Promulgate Rules).
100. § 67-5220(2); see also IRAP 810 (stating a preference for negotiated
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Negotiated rulemaking is a process that developed during the
1980s as an alternative to notice-and-comment rulemaking. The
defining attribute of the procedure is the bringing together of
representatives from the agency and the various groups of interested
persons to "seek consensus on the content of a rule." 1 The
procedure allows participants to share information, expertise, and
technical capabilities, thus encouraging an examination of factual
assumptions and policy preferences. If the various persons achieve
consensus on the content of the rule, it is likely to be easier to
implement and less likely to face judicial challenge. Even if con-
sensus is not achieved, the agency is likely to be much better
informed of the issues and concerns of the various interests. 10 2
It is important to note that the negotiated rulemaking provisions
are not mandatory; the APA encourages but does not require an
agency to engage in negotiated rulemaking. Furthermore, the agency
retains the final legal authority to determine the content of all
rules.0 3 This point has at least three corollaries. First, the agency
is not obligated to propose any rule that comes out of a negotiated
rulemaking. Since the agency retains full legal authority for all
rulemaking proposals, it may accept or reject in whole or in part the
outcome of the negotiation process. Second, agency actions relating to
the creation, negotiations, and termination of the negotiating
committee do not provide independent grounds for judicial review of
any eventual agency action.'" Third, a reviewing court is not to
give a rule greater deference merely because it was the product of a
negotiated rulemaking.
In addition to encouraging discussion between the agency and
interested persons, a pre-rulemaking notice such as the Notice of
Intent to Promulgate Rules offers several potential benefits even if
the agency does not initiate a negotiated rulemaking. It is likely to
save the agency time by alerting it to potential problems early in the
decisionmaking process. As a result, the agency may avoid the need
rulemaking), 813-15 (procedures for negotiated rulemaking).
101. § 67-5220(2).
102. Another potential outcome is consensus on some but not all issues
involved in a rulemaking - a result that helps to define the areas of
disagreement. Cf. IRAP 814 (requiring a report to be sent to the agency on any
consensus that develops).
103. See IRAP 815 ("The agency may accept in whole or in part or reject ther
consensus reached by the parties in publishing a proposed rule for notice and
comment.").
104. See IRAP 811 ("The determination of the agency whether to use . ..
negotiated rulemaking is not reviewable.").
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to rewrite drastically and therefore, to re-propose the text of a
proposed rule. Second, the notice will also facilitate public
involvement since concerns can be presented to the agency before it
has committed itself to particular language. The Notice of Intent to
Promulgate Rules does not preclude an agency from seeking
information and public comment by other methods such as
informational meetings, workshops, and the like. In fact, the Notice
of Intent to Promulgate Rules may be used to schedule such
alternative procedures.
2. Sections 67-5221 to 67-5225 and Section 67-5227: Mandatory
Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Procedures
The promulgation of notice-and-comment rules involves four
mandatory"5 steps:
a. publication in the Bulletin of a notice containing the text and
additional information on the proposed rule;10
b. concurrent notification of the legislature so that the Germane
Joint Subcommittees have an opportunity to consider the
proposal; 07
c. opportunity for the public to comment on the proposal; 08
d. publication in the Bulletin of the text of the final rule along with
a statement of reasons for the rule."9
a. Section 67-5221: Publication of a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is initiated with the publication
of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Bulletin.' 10 The APA
requires the notice to contain three types of information.
105. The APA specifies that a final rule "is voidable unless adopted in
substantial compliance with the requirements" of the Act. § 67-5231(1).
106. § 67-5221; see also IRAP 830 (requirements for Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking).
107. § 67-5223.
108. § 67-5222; see also IRAP 832 (comments on proposed rulemaking).
109. § 67-5224; see also IRAP 835 (requirements for adoption of final rule).
The full text of the final rule need not be published if there are no "significant
changes" between the proposed and final text. § 67-5224(3).
110. § 67-5221; see also IRAP 830 (requirements for Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking). In addition to publication in the Bulletin, the APA requires the Rules
Coordinator to publish an abbreviated notice of the proposed rulemaking in
newspapers throughout the state. See § 67-5221(2).
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(1) A statement of the authority for the rulemaking.1 This is
a double requirement: the agency must have been delegated both the
authority to promulgate rules and the authority to regulate the type
of conduct that the rule covers. While both delegations may be
contained in the same statutory provision, the distinction between
the two types of authority is crucial. The mere creation of an agency
and the delegation of authority to it to regulate specified conduct
does not in itself include the power to promulgate rules; that power
must be specifically delegated to the agency.' In addition to the
power to promulgate rules, the agency must have been granted the
power to regulate conduct within a substantive area. Substantively,
of course, an agency's rules may not exceed the scope of the discretion
delegated to it."'
(2) A description of the content and purpose of the proposed
rule, as well as its proposed text.1
(3) Information on the public's opportunity to comment on the
proposal." 5 The notice must include information on how to request
111. § 67-5221(1)(a).
112. E.g., Pumice Prods., Inc. v. Robison, 79 Idaho 144, 147, 312 P.2d 1026,
1027 (1957). This is, of course, an example of the general principle that an agency
is a creature of statute and has only those powers specifically granted to it. See
supra note 2. An exception to this principle is the recognition that an agency has
the implied authority to promulgate procedural rules. See Monroe v. Chapman, 105
Idaho 269, 270, 668 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1983).
Authority to promulgate rules may also be found in a combination of
federal and state law. For example, federal statutes authorize the governor to
designate a state agency to carry out federal programs. See, e.g., Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act (CERCLA) § 107(f)(2)(B),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B) (Supp. 1992); Child Care & Development Block Grant §
658D, 42 U.S.C. § 9858b(a) (Supp. 1992). In these circumstances, the delegation of
authority to promulgate rules is to be found in the conjunction of the federal
statute and gubernatorial designation. This follows from the definition of "provision
of law" to include both state and federal law. See § 67-5201(14). When a state
agency promulgates rules to implement a federal program, it is required to comply
with the state APA to the fullest extent possible.
113. E.g., Rhodes v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Idaho Sup. Ct. Rep. 1417, 1418
(1993); Grayot v. Summers, 75 Idaho 125, 132, 269 P.2d 765, 768-69 (1954);
Rawson v. Idaho State Bd. of Cosmetology, 107 Idaho 1037, 1040, 695 P.2d 422,
425 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho
387, 391 n.3, 797 P.2d 95, 99 n.3 (1990); see also infra notes 465-74 and
accompanying text (discussing judicial review of law-making function).
114. § 67-5221(1)(b)-(c).
115. § 67-5221(1)(d)-(g).
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an oral presentation.. 6 as well as how to submit written comments
on the proposed rule. 17
b. Section 67-5223: Legislative Notification of
Proposed Rulemaking
In addition to increasing public participation in rulemakings, the
APA also increases the opportunities for legislative participation.
This is accomplished by requiring the agency to provide the Director
of the Legislative Council with a copy of the Notice of the Proposed
Rulemaking in conjunction with submission of the Notice to the Rules
Coordinator for publication in the Bulletin.'l The Director is to
analyze the proposal and refer it to the appropriate Germane Joint
Subcommittee. The Subcommittee is empowered to acquire additional
information on the proposed rule through two procedures. First, it
may require the agency to prepare "an evaluation of the costs and
benefits of the rule, including any health, safety, or welfare costs and
benefits." 9 Second, the Subcommittee may also hold a hearing on
the proposed rule.12 To facilitate acquisition and evaluation of
additional information, the Subcommittee may require the agency to
extend the public comment period to receive the Subcommittee's
comments. 2 ' The APA thus grants the Germane Joint Subcom-
116. § 67-5221(1)(f). Unless the agency has no discretion because it is
complying with a controlling judicial order or the provisions of an amended state
or federal statute, the agency is required to provide an opportunity to make an
oral presentation on the proposed rule when it receives a request by twenty-five
people, a political subdivision, or another agency. § 67-5222(2). The section
specifies alternative methods of calculating the time limits for filing a petition for
an oral presentation. Id. When the agency provides less than twenty-eight days for
public comment, the petition must be filed within fourteen days after the notice is
published. Id. When the agency provides more than twenty-eight days for public
comment, the petition must be filed within fourteen days of the end of the
comment period. Id.
117. § 67-5221(1)(e).
118. § 67-5223. The requirement of "concurrent notification" of the Director of
Legislative Council does not require "simultaneous notification." Agencies, for
example, may contract with the Administrative Rules Coordinator to provide
notification when the Coordinator receives the rulemaking documents despite the
fact that this might result in slight delays in notifying the legislature. Since the
Rules Coordinator must receive the rules in advance of their publication in the
Bulletin, relying on the Rules Coordinator to provide legislative notification will
result in significantly expanded notice.
119. § 67-5223(3).
120. § 67-5223(2).
121. Id. The Subcommittee is required to notify the agency of its intent to
hold a hearing within fourteen days of the publication of the Notice of Proposed
Vol. 30
A PRIMER FOR THE PRACTITIONER
mittees broad power to bring additional public comment to the
agency's attention. Ultimately, of course, the Subcommittee's power is
political. Its comments and recommendations are not legally binding
on the agency.
c. Section 67-5222: Opportunity for Comment on
Proposed Rules
An agency is required to provide the public with an opportunity
to comment on all proposed rules. 122 This does not, however, require
the agency to schedule an oral presentation 121 on each proposed
rule. The opportunity for public comment on proposed rules is
generally satisfied if the agency provides an opportunity to submit
written comments."2 The argument that the opportunity to make
an oral presentation will lead to a fuller understanding of the
presenter's concerns is particularly questionable in the case of
complex or technical rulemakings. In general, written comments are
not only less expensive and time consuming than are oral
presentations, they are also a far clearer and more efficient method
of presenting relevant "data, views, and arguments."125 Concern
that an agency may too easily brush aside written comments is better
resolved by requiring the agency to demonstrate that it has
considered fully all comments. 12  Thus, while an agency may
provide one or more oral presentations in conjunction with any
rulemaking, the APA requires it to do so only under three conditions:
(1) when the agency receives a written request for an oral
presentation from twenty-five persons, a political subdivision, or an
another agency;12 (2) when the agency is promulgating a substan-
tive rule;" and (3) the agency has discretion on the content of the rule."2
Rulemaking in the Administrative Bulletin or within fourteen days of the end of
the comment period. Id.
122. § 67-5222.
123. The Act employs the term "oral presentation" to make explicit that it
does not require a trial-type proceeding during the rulemaking. While an agency
is, of course, free to employ such procedures if it chooses, the statute does not
mandate such formality. Rather, it is presumed that the proceedings generally will
be legislative rather than adjudicative in format. See IRAP 833.03 (procedures for
oral presentations).
124. § 67-5222(1).
125. Id.
126. The APA seeks to ensure full consideration by requiring the agency to
provide an explanation of its decision. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying
text (discussing publication of final rules).
127. § 67-5222(2); see also IRAP 833 (content requirements for petition for
oral presentation).
128. § 67-5222(2).
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At a minimum, an agency is required to provide the public with
twenty-one days within which to comment on the proposed rule;
1 30
as with other time periods applicable in a rulemaking, the agency
may extend the comment period. The period will automatically be
extended by either a petition for an oral presentation 3 ' or by a
decision of the Germane Joint Subcommittee to hold a public
hearing.
3 1
d. Section 67-5224: Publication of Final Rules
Following the close of the comment period, the agency is
required to "consider fully all written and oral submissions.
Following this consideration, the final step in the rulemaking process
is the publication of the text of the final rule in the Bulletin1
4
along with "a concise explanatory statement" of "the reasons for
adopting the final rule" and of "the reasons for any changes" between
the proposed and final rule.
35
The requirement that the agency provide a concise explanatory
statement imposes three obligations: the agency must give its reasons
for adopting the final rule, 31 for rejecting comments on the
proposed rule,3 7 and for any changes to the text of the proposed
129. Id. The agency is not required to provide an opportunity for oral
presentation when it has no discretion as to the substantive content of the
proposed rule because the rule is being promulgated to comply with either "a
controlling judicial decision or court order" or "the provisions of a statute or
federal rule that has been amended since the adoption of the agency rule." Id.
130. § 67-5222(1); see also IRAP 832 (procedural requirements for comments).
131. § 67-5222(2). But see supra note 129.
132. § 67-5223(2).
133. § 67-5224(1).
134. The full text of the final rule need not be published when the Rules
Coordinator agrees that there are no significant changes between the text of the
proposed and final rules. § 67-5224(3). In such cases, only the changes - and a
citation to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - need to be published.
135. § 67-5224(2); see also IRAP 835 (content requirements for statement to
be published with final rule).
136. § 67-5224(2)(a).
137. The requirement that the agency provide reasons for rejecting comments
is implicit in the requirement that the agency "consider fully all written and oral
submissions," § 67-5224(1), and in the general idea of reasoned decisionmaking.
This does not mean that the agency is required to respond to every comment. It
is, however, required to respond to all significant issues. For example, when
several comments raise the same point, the agency need not respond to each
comment individually as long as it addresses the issue. See IRAP 835.01.a. If the
agency fails to respond to comments that raise significant issues, it is likely to be
held to have been arbitrary and capricious.
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rule.'38 This requirement is perhaps the most significant change in
the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions. It springs from
the premise that decisionmaking is improved when the decision-
maker is required to explain the reasons for the decision. The
requirement is analogous to the provision in the federal APA
requiring an agency, "[aifter consideration" of the public comment, to
provide a "concise general statement of [the rule's] basis and
purpose."'39 Under the federal APA, the agency's statement "need
not be an exhaustive, detailed account of every aspect of the
rulemaking proceedings," but it must "indicate the major issues of
policy that were raised in the proceedings and explain why the
agency decided to respond to these issues as it did, particularly in
light of the statutory objectives that the rule must serve." 40 The
general point - and one that is applicable to rulemakings under the
Idaho APA - is simply stated: an agency must explain why it chose
to promulgate the rule. While this does not mean that the statement
must discuss every item of fact or opinion contained in the public
comments, the Idaho APA does require the agency to demonstrate
that it considered the issues raised by the comments and that it had
a rational reason for the conclusions it reached.' Furthermore,
since it is this statement of reasons rather than any post hoc
rationalizations that is to provide the principled basis for judicial
review of agency rulemakings, an agency that fails to offer such an
explanation is likely to be held to have acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.
e. Section 67-5227: Variance Between Proposed and Final Rules
The need for a statement of reasons is particularly pressing
when the agency changes the text of a rule between the proposed and
final rule. Recognition of this fact is reflected in the Act's provisions
covering situations in which the content of the rule varies between
the proposed and final rulemaking 1 12 These provisions seek to
138. § 67-5224(2)(b).
139. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1992).
140. Independent U.S. Tank Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 (1987); see, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983); United States v.
Garner, 767 F.2d 104, 116-18 (5th Cir. 1985); BENJAMIN W. MINTZ & NANCY G.
MILLER, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO
FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 264-72 (2d ed. 1991).
141. Cf Holly Care Ctr. v. State Dep't of Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 78, 714
P.2d 45, 47 (1986) (regulations "are invalid . . .which are not reasonably related
to the purposes of the enabling legislation").
142. § 67-5227; see also IRAP 835.01.b (requiring explanation when final rule
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balance the two purposes for publishing a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. One is to provide notice of the agency's intent to take
action potentially affecting certain interests. A second purpose is to
initiate public comment on the proposal. Public participation would,
however, be a hollow ritual if it could not affect the agency's
decisionmaking. Since an agency would be unlikely to change its
position if it were required to begin anew every time it did so, a
requirement that the agency publish a new proposed rule when it
sought to make any changes in the text of the original proposal
would undermine the public participation goal."" At the same time,
however, if an agency's final rule differs too greatly from its proposal,
some persons may rightfully claim they had no notice that their
interests were potentially affected by the rulemaking. The balance
struck by the Act is to allow the agency to adopt a final rule that
varies from the proposed rule as long as the final rule "is a logical
outgrowth" of the proposed rule and the notice that accompanied the
proposed rulemaking "reasonably notified" the public of the subject of
the agency decisionmaking. T'
f. Section 67-5225: Rulemaking Record
The APA's mandate that an agency provide an explanation of its
decision is reinforced by the additional requirement that, the agency
compile a "rulemaking record."'45 The record is to include public
comments, written materials relied upon by the agency, and any
materials prepared in conjunction with the rulemaking. " While
the Act specifically notes that the record "need not constitute the
exclusive basis" for an agency's decision or for judicial review of that
decision, " 7 requiring the agency to prepare the record does increase
differs from proposed rule).
143. E.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 n.51
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting "the absurdity that . . . the agency can learn from the
comments on its proposals only at the peril of starting a new procedural round of
commentary.").
144. § 67-5227; see, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 750-52 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 546-47
(D.C. Cir. 1983); see also § 67-5227 cmt. (citing Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d at 750-52).
145. § 67-5225; see also IRAP 834 (content requirements for rulemaking
record).
146. § 67-5225(2).
147. § 67-5225(3) & cmt. 3. Agencies are required to keep the record for one
year after the effective date of the rule. § 67-5225(4). In the original drafts of the
Act, there was a one-year statute of limitations on challenges to the validity of
rules based on noncompliance with the Act's procedures. This was subsequently
changed to a two-year limitation. § 67-5231(2). The requirement in subsection (4)
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the procedural formality of the rulemaking process. It should also
increase the rationality of agency decisionmaking by forcing agency
decisionmakers to evaluate the bases of their decision and by
increasing the thoroughness of judicial review of that decision-
making.
g. Section 67-5224: Effective Dates
Rules generally become final twenty-one days after their
publication in the Bulletin."' The Act, however, allows the agency
to specify a different effective date." 9 This will allow an agency to
delay the effectiveness of the rule or to provide a shorter period or
even a retroactive effective date. The situations in which an agency
can provide a retroactive effective date are limited by due process.
When, however, the agency is conferring a benefit or removing a
disability, correcting a mistake or complying with changes in.govern-
ing law, there may be no good reason for delay and retroactivity is
unlikely to pose constitutional problems.
3. Sections 67-5226 and 67-5228: Temporary Rules and
Exemptions
While the overwhelming majority of rules will be promulgated
under the mandatory notice-and-comment procedures, in some situa-
tions an agency may be required to act with greater speed. The APA
recognizes three situations in which immediate action is permis-
sible:15 when it is "reasonably necessary" to protect public health,
safety, or welfare; 5 when compliance with deadlines contained in
an amended statute or federal program requires the agency to
should have also been changed to the longer period. Agencies are, therefore,
strongly advised to maintain the rulemaking record for two years, rather than the
statutorily required one year.
148. § 67-5224(5).
149. Id.; see also IRAP 835.02 (requiring effective date to be published in
Bulletin).
150. In addition to the three situations recognized in the APA itself, the
legislature can also authorize an agency to employ the temporary rulemaking
procedures. For example, the Fish and Game Commission is specifically empow-
ered, "[wihenever it finds it necessary for the preservation, protection, or
management of any wildlife of this state, by reason of any act of God or any other
sudden or unexpected emergency, [to] declare by temporary rule the existence of
such necessity, and the cause thereof' and close the affected areas to hunting or
fishing. § 36-104(b)(3).
151. § 67-5226(1)(a).
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employ an expedited procedure;'52 and when the agency is confer-
ring a benefit and there is no good reason to delay the effectiveness
of the benefit for the period required to comply with notice-and-
comment rulemaking.153 In these situations, the agency may take
expeditious action if it makes a finding that it is required to employ
the expedited procedures and includes that finding and a supporting
statement of the reasons in the rulemaking record.' When it
complies with these requirements, the agency may promulgate the
rule without complying with the notice-and-comment provisions and
may make the rule immediately effective.'55
The primary procedural protection against abuse of these
expedited procedures is the limited duration of temporary rules: a
temporary rule is in force for only eighteen weeks.'56 If the agency
has begun notice-and-comment proceedings to adopt a final rule, a
temporary rule may be extended for an additional nine weeks.'57
The APA also allows an expedited procedure when an agency
amends a final rule "to correct typographical errors, transcription
errors, or clerical errors.""' 8 This provision will allow agencies to
correct the types of nonsubstantive errors that inevitably occur. The
check on potential abuse is the requirement that all changes be
approved by the Rules Coordinator.'59
4. Section 67-5229: Incorporation by Reference
Modern regulation often involves highly technical areas in which
several different governmental or private standard-setting organi-
zations may be involved. Similarly, many social programs involve
overlapping federal and state responsibilities. As a result, state
agency rules often incorporate standards or requirements established
by other entities. Where such standards or requirements are volu-
minous, the cost of republishing them verbatim in the agency's rules
can be prohibitive. At the same time, however, it is important that
152. § 67-5226(1)(b).
153. § 67-5226(1)(c).
154. § 67-5226(1); see also IRAP 840 (requirements for promulgating tempo-
rary rules). The agency's finding is subject to judicial review because it is "agency
action." See §§ 67-5201(3), -5270.
155. § 67-5226(1). The agency is required to give "such notice as is practica-
ble," id., and to publish the text of the rule and the finding supporting the use of
the expedited procedures in the "first available" issue of the Bulletin. § 67-5226(3).
156. § 67-5226(2).
157. Id.
158. § 67-5228; see also IRAP 850 (provisions for correction of errors).
159. § 67-5228.
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individuals whose conduct is regulated by the rules have notice of
and access to the applicable legal requirements. The APA balances
the goals of notice and economy by allowing the agency to incorporate
such materials by reference but requiring the agency to make the
incorporated material available to the public.160 The Act requires
the rule to state where the incorporated materials are available.1"'
If it is not generally available in documents such as the Code of
Federal Regulations, the agency is also required to provide a copy of
the materials to the state library and to the Rules Coordinator.6 2
The APA explicitly provides that the incorporation is of the
particular standards. Thus, if previously incorporated standards are
changed, the agency is required to initiate a rulemaking if it wishes
to incorporate changes to previously incorporated materials.6 3 It
will often be necessary, of course, only to change the date of the
reference.
5. Sections 67-5230 and 67-5231: Initiating Agency Decisionmaking
The APA gives individuals the power to initiate agency action in
two situations. First, an individual "may petition an agency
requesting the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule."'" While
the agency is not obligated to initiate a rulemaking in response to a
request, it must decide whether or not to do so within twenty-eight
days." If it decides not to begin a rulemaking, an agency must
explain in writing its reasons for refusing to do so. 66 A decision not
to begin a rulemaking is a. final agency action 16 1 subject to judicial
review."
The second method by which an individual can require an
agency to make a decision is by petitioning it for a declaratory ruling
on "the applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule
administered by the agency."'69 Again, the agency's decision on the
160. § 67-5229(1).
161. § 67-5229(1)(a).
162. § 67-5229(1)(b).
163. § 67-5229(2).
164. § 67-5230; see also IRAP 820-822 (procedural and content requirements of
petition and agency response).
165. § 67-5230(1)(a).
166. Id.
167. § 67-5230(2).
168. § 67-5270(2); see also § 67-5230 cmt. 2 (noting that the denial of a
petition for adoption of rules "is a final agency action subject to judicial review").
169. § 67-5232(1).
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request for a declaratory ruling is a final agency action17 subject to
judicial review."
6. Section 67-5231: Penalty for Noncompliance with
Procedural Requirements
A final rule that is adopted without "substantial compliance"
with the rulemaking procedures is voidable. 172 Rules are made
"voidable" rather than "void" primarily because a judicial decree
holding a rule invalid should not automatically require beneficiaries
of the rule to return the benefits received. While the substantive
validity of a rule may always be challenged, 173 the APA limits
procedural challenges to actions brought within two years of the
adoption of the rule.1 7 ' The limitation is based not only on the
traditional justifications for statutes of limitation, but also on the
conclusion that the existence of the rule itself has provided sufficient
notice after the passage of two years so that any procedural
irregularities in its promulgation will have been rendered harmless.
This reflects the fact that the section applies to procedural rather
than substantive invalidity.
B. Rules versus Orders
When the legislature creates an agency to administer a program,
it generally empowers the agency to make policy within limits
established by the statute creating the agency.'75 To implement this
policymaking power, agencies commonly are granted the authority
both to promulgate rules and to decide contested cases. Stated more
generally, the agency is delegated discretion on whether to formulate
policy through the promulgation of regulations or through an
adjudicatory, case-by-contested-case procedure. It may act, in other
words, either like a legislative body or like a court. For example, the
170. § 67-5232(3).
171. § 67-5270(2).
172. § 67-5231(1); cf § 67-5279(2) ("[Tjhe [reviewing] court shall affirm the
agency action unless the court finds that the action was . . . (c) made upon
unlawful procedure.").
173. See § 67-5273(1).
174. § 67-5231(2). The section requires only that the action be commenced
within two years of the making of the rule. It does not require a final resolution
of the challenge within that period. See § 67-5231 cmt. 4.
175. E.g., Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 102 Idaho 744, 750,
639 P.2d 442, 448 (1981) (an agency has no jurisdiction beyond that specifically
granted to it by statute); see also supra note 2 (discussing agencies' lack of
inherent power).
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director of Water Resources might promulgate a rule requiring a
particular class of water users to measure the volume of water they
divert. Alternatively, the director might issue an order in a contested
case directing the parties to measure their diversions. In either
situation, the director has made policy. 7 ' The choice of procedure,
however, has significant consequences:'77 the pre-decisional notice,
type of "hearing," mechanisms for decisionmaking, post-decisional
notice, and scope of judicial review differ between a rulemaking and
a contested case. These variations have differing effects on both
individuals subject to the agency's authority and on the agency itself
- differences that limit the agency's discretion in choosing a
policymaking procedure.
1. Pre-Decisional Notice
The pre-decisional notice provided by rulemaking and contested
case procedures differs in two significant ways. First, the persons
who receive notice are different. In a rulemaking, the public is given
notice of the proposal through publication in the Bulletin.7 ' In a
contested case, on the other hand, only the parties to the proceeding
receive notice.7 9 As a result, the participants in the agency
decisionmaking process also differ: in a rulemaking, all potentially
affected individuals have an opportunity to present their views and
arguments on the proposal to the agency before a final decision is
reached; in a contested case, frequently only the parties to the
proceeding have an opportunity to present information and argument
176. Cf State ex rel. Griner v. Bunker Hill Co., 95 Idaho 840, 842-43, 521
P.2d 664, 666-67 (1974) (Inspector of Mines might either promulgate a rule
requiring mine owners to allow a worker representative to accompany the inspector
or might embody that requirement in an order addressed to a specific owner).
177. See 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 177-85 (1965);
Richard K. Berg, Re-Examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking
and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149 (1986); Arthur E. Bonfield, State
Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking Methodology, 42
ADMIN. L. REV. 121 (1990); Glen 0. Robinson, The Making of Administrative
Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure
Reform, 118 U. PA. L. -REV. 485 (1970); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 921 (1965).
178. § 67-5221; see also supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text (discussing
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). The difference in the persons who receive notice
is reflected in the APA's definitions of "party" and "person." See § 67-5201(12)-(13);
see also supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing terms "party" and
.person").
179. § 67-5242(1).
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to the decisionmaker. Rulemaking thus may provide better notice to
the class of persons potentially affected by the new standard.
Second, the notice that initiates a contested case proceeding
provides no notice that the agency may create a new legal standard
in its decision of the case. Adjudication as a mechanism for making
decisions is necessarily at least somewhat ad hoc and retroactive
since it normally involves determining consequences for past conduct;
rulemaking, on the other hand, is prospective in application. While
retroactive lawmaking is unavoidable in the judicial system because
courts generally have no alternative, agencies generally do have an
alternative since they often can promulgate a rule that will provide
prospective notice. The fundamental policy question is whether this
difference between courts and agencies affects an agency's discretion
to choose an adjudicatory decisionmaking procedure.
It is clear at least as a general principle that an agency is not
prohibited by due process from creating new policy through a
contested case.' s The more difficult question is whether the notice/
retroactive decisionmaking problem should lead agencies to rely upon
rulemaking to formulate general policy. Although it might seem that
it would always be preferable to announce new policy through
rulemakings, it may not always be possible to do so. A policy question
that arises in the context of a contested case must be decided by the
agency; requiring it to stop the contested case and promulgate a rule
will generally not be a suitable solution. Moreover, there often are
reasons that justify continued reliance on a case-by-contested-case
development: the agency may not have sufficient experience to be
able to formulate statute-like standards before deciding an initial
group of contested cases; or generalized standards may have no more
than marginal utility because the area is one of highly disparate
factual situations.' In short, as is true generally of due process,
the problem is one of balancing conflicting objectives."8 2
The Idaho Supreme Court has found that the retroactive effect
inherent in adjudicatory decisionmaking does impose some due
process limits on the agency's authority to formulate policy within
the confines of an individual contested case. For example, when a
. 180. E.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969). The
Supreme Court has suggested that a different result might be required if the
change imposed adverse consequences on those who relied on the prior policy or
one in which fines or penalties were imposed. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 295 (1974); see also Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1009-10 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982).
181. E.g., Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 294-95.
182. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
[Vol. 30
A PRIMER FOR THE PRACTITIONER
statute authorizes a professional licensing agency to impose sanctions
for "gross negligence" or "unprofessional conduct," the agency is
required to promulgate rules clarifying its interpretation of those
terms when it seeks to impose sanctions for conduct falling outside of
the core conduct proscribed by the statute." Thus, the court has
held that a statute authorizing sanctions for "gross negligence" and
"misconduct" did not provide constitutionally sufficient notice that
"poor judgment" could lead to sanctions." If the agency .believed
that poor judgment fell within the statutory terms, it was required to
promulgate a regulation to that effect." This notice requirement
may also apply when an agency policy change imposes new liabilities
on previously permissible conduct. For example, the court refused to
allow the Idaho Public Utilities Commission to dismiss - rather
than to return - a rate application the commission had found to be
defective because it had not provided notice that defective applica-
tions could be dismissed.' The notice element of due process thus
limits an agency's discretion to choose policymaking procedures.
2. Hearings and the Opportunity to Participate
As with notice, the type of hearing, the ability to participate,
and the type of information presented to the agency decisionmaker
varies markedly between a rulemaking and a contested case. As
noted,"7 the "hearing" on a proposed rule may be restricted to
written statements; even when an agency provides an opportunity for
an oral presentation, the proceeding is likely to be modeled on the
legislative hearing rather than on a trial. A contested case, on the
other hand, is a proceeding based on the judicial hearing in which
parties present evidence and examine witnesses. One result of these
183. Where the conduct falls within the core conduct of the statutory term or
the agency relies on expert witnesses, additional regulations are unnecessary. See
Krueger v. Board of Professional Discipline, 122 Idaho 577, 580-82, 836 P.2d 523,
526-28 (1992); Moosman v. Idaho Horse Racing Comm'n, 117 Idaho 949, 952-54,
793 P.2d 181, 184-86 (1990).
184. H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Professional Eng'rs & Land
Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 650-51, 747 P.2d 55, 59-60 (1987).
185. Id.; see also Rincover v. State Dep't of Finance, 124 Idaho __, 866 P.2d
177 (1993) (statutory term "dishonest or unethical practices" failed to provide
notice that obtaining loans from clients was prohibited); Tuma v. Board of
Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 79-80, 593 P.2d 711, 716-17 (1979) (statutory term
"unprofessional conduct" did not provide notice that discussion of alternative
therapies with patient was proscribed).
186. Intermountain Gas Co. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 98 Idaho 718, 720-
24, 571 P.2d 1119, 1121-25 (1977).
187. See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
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differences is that the agency's ability to define the issues and to
elicit information is greater in a rulemaking than in a contested case.
In a rulemaking, for example, an agency may solicit the comments of
persons who have expertise helpful to the decision or may employ the
expert to produce a study. The agency's opportunity to do so in a
contested case is far more limited.
The ability to participate in the oral presentation also is
fundamentally different. While any interested person may present
information and arguments to the decisionmaker in a rulemaking,
generally only parties to the proceeding may participate in the
contested case.' s As a result, other persons who may be affected by
the precedential effect of the agency's decision may have no method
to bring their concerns to the attention of the decisionmaker.
Furthermore, strategic concerns may prevent even the immediate
parties to the contested case from asserting certain positions. A
rulemaking proceeding thus is more likely to provide the agency with
the full range of information and argument relevant to proposed
policy.
Finally, the type of facts relevant in each proceeding is different.
In Kenneth' Culp Davis's terms, "legislative facts" are relevant in
creating general policy while "adjudicative facts" are relevant in
deciding individual liability based on past events:
Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did
what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent;
adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a
jury in a jury case. Legislative facts are roughly the kind of
facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and
policy and discretion. 89
An agency that sets out to create a general legal standard ought to
consider more general, legislative facts; facts about individual
situations are relevant to general policy determinations primarily as
examples.
188. Compare § 67-5201(12) (" 'Party' means each person or agency named or
admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as
a party") with § 67-5201(13) (" 'Person' means any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, governmental subdivision or agency, or public or private
organization or entity of any. character."). But see IRAP 355 (defining "public
witness" and providing for witnesses not associated with any party to give
testimony when allowed by the presiding officer).
189. 2 KENNETH C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3, at 413 (2d
ed. 1979).
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At the same time, the breadth of rules may create problems of
overinclusiveness that can inhibit desired behavior. Since the holding
in a contested case is no broader than the facts that gave rise to the
order, orders are less likely to be overinclusive. As a result, the slow,
case-by-case evolution of policy through contested case proceedings is
easier to modify. Policymaking through contested cases thus provides
a significant amount of flexibility that may be advantageous when
the full implications of a policy - and thus its potential problems -
are difficult to foresee. Particularly in areas of highly disparate
factual situations, the increased flexibility and the narrower scope of
orders may be beneficial. 90
3. Post-Decisional Notice
Publication of the final rule in the Bulletin and its inclusion in
the Code gives all persons notice of what the law requires; only the
parties to the contested case, on the other hand, are given notice of
the new standard. While the APA does ameliorate this post-decisional
notice problem by requiring an agency to create an index of all orders
upon which it intends to rely as precedent in subsequent contested
cases,' the degree of notice provided by an index in the agency
offices is still less than the notice provided by publication in the
Bulletin and the Code.
4. Scope of Judicial Review
The scope of judicial review of agency rulemakings differs from
that applied to contested case decisions. There are two primary
differences. First, the standard of review applicable to the agency's
factual decisions differs: rulemakings are subjected to the arbitrary
and capricious standard,'9 2 while contested cases are reviewed
under the substantial evidence standard.'93 Perhaps even more
significantly, the decision record plays a distinctly different role in
190. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974). But see infra
notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
191. § 67-5250(1); see also infra notes 334-36 and accompanying text
(discussing requirement that agency index all orders upon which it intends to
rely).
192. § 67-5279(2)(d); see Holly Care Ctr. v. State Dep't of Employment, 110
Idaho 76, 78, 714 P.2d 45, 47 (1986).
193. § 67-5279(3)(d); see Local 1494 of Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 633-35, 586 P.2d 1346, 1349-50 (1978); Department of
Health & Welfare v. Sandoval, 113 Idaho 186, 189-90, 742 P.2d 992, 995-96 (Ct.
App. 1987).
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each situation. In a rulemaking, the agency is not required to base its
decision solely on information contained in the record;"9 4 the deci-
sion in a contested case, on the other hand, must be based exclusively
on the evidence presented or officially noticed during the hearing and
preserved in the record. 95 The application by a reviewing court of
the substantial evidence standard to a record created at a formal
evidentiary hearing restrains the agency's decisionmaking more than
does the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to an
open-ended "record." 9 '
5. Stare Decisis: Orders versus Rules
A final distinction between rules and orders is the legal effect of
each. Only the parties to a contested case are bound by the order in
that case.'97 Persons who were not parties are affected only to the
extent that the agency is restrained by the doctrine of stare decisis.
Significantly, the agency itself is far less restricted by its orders than
by its rules. Validly promulgated rules have the force and effect of
law and therefore bind not only the public but also the agency.'98
The agency may, on the other hand, distinguish or overrule an order
in any subsequent contested case.'99 As a result, while persons
subject to the agency's regulatory authority ignore those orders the
agency chooses to index at their peril,2" the agency itself is far less
restrained by the same orders.
194. §§ 67-5225(3), -5279(2) & cmt. 3.
195. §§ 67-5248(2), -5249(3), -5279(3) & cmt. 4.
196. Arguably, it is the requirement that a contested case be decided on the
basis of a record created at a hearing that is the more important distinction. In
fact, the distinctions between "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary or capricious"
may be -no more than differing verbal incantations of the more familiar
'reasonableness." Cf Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of
Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) ("[1In their application to
the requirement of factual support the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary
or capricious test are one and the same.").
197. Cf § 67-5246(6)-(7) (limitation on the effectiveness of final orders).
198. See, e.g., Hoppe v. Nichols, 100 Idaho 133, 137, 594 P.2d 643, 647 (1979)
(an agency is bound by its rules); see also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying
text. While the agency may amend or repeal its rules, it is required to go through
a full, notice-and-comment rulemaking to do so. See § 67-5201(17) & cmt. 17.
199. For example, the Supreme Court of Idaho has said: "So long as regula-
tory bodies adequately explain their departure from prior rulings so that a
reviewing court can determine that their decisions are not arbitrary or capricious,
orders based upon positions substantially different than those taken in previous
proceedings can be upheld." Intermountain Gas Co. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
97 Idaho 113, 119, 540 P.2d 775, 761 (1975).
200. See § 67-5250(1).
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C. Orders and Contested Cases
The third part of the new APA - §§ 67-5240 to 67-5255 -
contains the procedures for contested cases. The new APA's contested
case provisions attend to a number of areas neither addressed nor
contemplated by the old APA. It is the detail and the elaboration of
the contested case provisions that are the essential elements of the
new APA.
1. Section 67-5240: Introducing the Contested Case
Section 67-5240 provides that all proceedings by an agency -
other than the Public Utilities Commission or the Industrial
Commission - that may result in the issuance of an "order" are
governed by the contested case provisions of the APA unless
otherwise provided by law.21  The section resolves several
ambiguities present in the former APA.
First, the section makes it clear that any proceeding that may
result in the issuance of an "order" is a contested case.21 2 "Order" is
defined by the Act as an "agency action of particular applicability
that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or
other legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons."0 ' Thus, it
is the legal effect of the decision - whether it affects an enumerated
interest - that determines whether the agency must conduct a
contested case, not whether the legislature has provided by statute
for a hearing.
The section also specifically excludes the Public Utilities
Commission and the Industrial Commission from the APA's contested
case provisions.3 4 These commissions were excluded because the
acts establishing them provide more detailed procedural require-
ments that would be difficult to square with the APA's contested case
201. § 67-5240; see also supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (discussing
distinction between legislative and adjudicative decisionmaking).
202. The old APA had procedures for "contested cases." See Act of Mar. 29,
1965, ch. 273, § 9, 1965 Idaho Sess. Laws 701, 706 (formerly codified at § 67-5209
(1989)). It did not, however, define the term with the clarity of the current act. A
"contested case" was defined as "a proceeding . . . in which the legal rights,
duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency
after an opportunity for hearing." Id. § 1(2) (formerly codified at § 67-5201(2)). It
was unclear if this meant that a proceeding that determined the legal rights,
duties or privileges of an individual was not a "contested case" when the statute
did not provide an opportunity for hearing.
203. § 67-5201(11).
204. § 67-5240.
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procedures. 0 5  The explicit exclusion for the Public Utilities
Commission and the Industrial Commission obviates the need for the
supreme court to fit together the detailed procedural requirements
applicable to them with the APA.
2. Section 67-5241: Informal Disposition of Disputes
Most disputes between an agency and a person subject to its
jurisdiction are resolved through informal methods rather than
through contested case proceedings. The APA explicitly recognizes
that "[i]nformal settlement of matters is to be encouraged."0 6 The
Act's provisions on informal settlements - as well as the legislature's
encouragement of such settlements - is new. At the same time, such
informal methods almost by definition elude cataloging. Nonetheless,
the section recognizes two recurrent situations.
In the first situation, it is the agency that has the burden of
initiating a contested case.0 7 For example, an agency may be
informed of an apparent violation of its regulations. The agency may
decline to initiate proceedings because a staff investigation
determines that there was no violation.2 8 On the other hand, if the
investigation produces evidence of a possible violation, the agency
may informally resolve the problem with the apparent violator or
may file a contested case. The regulation of holders of professional
licenses is an example of this category of adjudicatory actions.
205. See §§ 72-701 to -737 (Industrial Commission procedures); §§ 61-601 to
-642 (Public Utilities Commission procedures).
206. § 67-5241(1)(c); see also IRAP 100-102; cf. § 67-5220 & cmt. 3 (informal,
negotiated rulemaking is encouraged by the Notice of Intent to Promulgate Rules).
207. See § 67-5241(1).
208. § 67-5241(1)(a). When an agency declines to initiate a contested case
after it has been requested to do so, it must furnish a brief statement of the
reasons for its decision to all persons involved unless the matter is an
investigation performed by a law enforcement agency. § 67-5241(3); cf. § 9-337(5)
(defining "law enforcement agency").
The agency's refusal to initiate a contested case would be final agency
action that is subject to judicial review only if a statute imposed a duty on the
agency. See § 67-5201(3)(c) (defining "Agency action" to include "an agency's
performance of, or failure to perform, any duty placed on it by law"). Thus, an
agency decision not to institute a contested case is likely to be essentially
unreviewable discretion except when the legislature has specified criteria for
initiating such actions. Compare Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985)
(creating a presumption of unreviewability of agency decisions not to take
enforcement action) with Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566-68 (1975) (statute
contained sufficient standards to rebut presumption of unreviewability).
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The second generic situation arises when the burden of initiating
the contested case is on the person subject to the agency's regulatory
jurisdiction. For example, an agency may be informed of a possible
violation, initiate an investigation, and, if it concludes that there are
grounds to believe that a violation has occurred, issue the person a
notice of violation. If the person does not initiate a contested case
within a specified period, the notice of violation becomes conclusive
without a contested case proceeding. Many environmental statutes
incorporate this regulatory approach.2"
The section also authorizes other informal methods for resolving
disputes. For example, agencies are authorized to hold paper
hearings instead of oral hearings if it will expedite the case "without
substantially prejudicing the interests" of a party.10 The statute
also allows parties to negotiate, stipulate, settle, or use consent
orders rather than go to hearing in a contested case.2 ' Similarly,
when the parties can agree on the facts and it is only the law that
remains in dispute, summary-judgment like procedures may be
used.212  While encouraging the use of informal methods for
resolving disputes, the APA explicitly prohibits the agency from
abdicating its ultimate responsibility for the contested case;
stipulated facts, for example, remain contingent until accepted by the
agency.213
Disposition of a dispute under any of these provisions is a "final
agency action."21 4 Even if the disposition does not result in the issu-
ance of an order, it is subject to judicial review.2"5
209. E.g., § 39-108(3)(a) (administrative enforcement action involving notice of
violation that triggers fifteen-day response period).
210. § 67-5241(1)(b); cf § 67-5251(2) (provision for admission of evidence in
written form).
211. § 67-5241(1)(c). For the first time, consent agreements and consent
orders, common tools before a number of agencies, are given a statutory basis. See
also IRAP 280 (provisions on consent agreements).
212. § 67-5241(1)(d).
213. The Attorney General's Rules provide that agencies are not bound by
stipulations or settlements and may require further production of evidence to prove
the facts underlying the stipulation or settlement "when one or more parties to a
proceeding is not party to the settlement or when the settlement presents issues of
significant implication for other persons." IRAP 612. By contrast, the agency may
"summarily accept settlement of essentially private disputes that have no
significant implications for administration of the law for persons other than the
affected parties." Id.
214. § 67-5241(4). But see supra note 208.
215. See §§ 67-5270(2) (a person aggrieved by a final agency action other than
an order), -5270(3) (a person aggrieved by an order). In either case, the person
aggrieved must comply with the requirements of §§ 67-5271 through 67-5279.
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3. Sections 67-5242 and 67-5251: Procedure at the
Evidentiary Hearing
If the dispute cannot be settled informally, section 67-5242 of
the APA contains the procedures to be employed in evidentiary
hearings. As noted,216 the Idaho APA does not specify procedural
minutiae such as the format and content requirements for various
filings, discovery rules, and the like. Instead, the Act delegates theAttorney General the power to promulgate uniform procedural rules
217iso foa"mdlfor use by the majority of agencies. This provision for a "model"
set of agency rules is new.
a. Section 67-5242: Notice and Prehearing Procedures
The APA requires that all parties to a contested case be notified
of the time, place, and' nature of the hearing, the legal authority
under which it is to be held, and a short and plain statement of the
matters asserted or the issues involved. 2" The drafters of the APA
recognized that the minimal statutory provisions would be supplem-
ented by the Attorney General's procedural rules. These rules
provided the procedures applicable to intervention,21 prehearing
216. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
217. § 67-5206(2). Specifically, the Attorney General was directed to
promulgate rules of procedure addressing:
(a) form and content to be employed in giving notice of a contested case;
(b) procedures and standards required for intervention in a contested case;
(c) procedures for prehearing conferences;
(d) format for pleadings, briefs, and motions;
(e) the method by which service shall be made;
(f) procedures for the issuance of subpoenas, discovery orders, and protect-
ive orders if authorized by other provisions of law;
(g) qualifications for persons seeking to act as a hearing officer;
(h) qualifications for persons seeking to act as a representative for parties
to contested cases;
(i) procedures to facilitate informal settlement of matters;
(j) procedures for placing ex parte contacts on the record; and
(k) such other provisions as may be necessary or useful.
§ 67-5206(4).
218. § 67-5242(1). The Attorney General's Rules supplement the statutory
requirements. The Rules require the notice to include the name of the presiding
officer. See IRAP 550. This requirement is important for the exercise of a party's
right of disqualification of presiding officers under the APA. See § 67-5252; see also
infra notes 245-56 and accompanying text.
219. § 67-5206(4)(b); see also IRAP 350-55.
[Vol. 30
A PRIMER FOR THE PRACTITIONER
conferences,22  pleadings, briefs, and motions,221 service,222  and
subpoenas, discovery orders, and protective orders.223
220. § 67-5206(4)(c); see also IRAP 510-13.
221. § 67-5206(4)(d); see also IRAP 210, 220, 230, 240, 250, 260, 270, 280.
Several of the Attorney General's Rules were based on the rules applicable in
district courts. Compare IRAP 210 with IRCP 7(a); compare IRAP 250 with IDAHO
R. Civ. P. 24(a); compare IRAP 260 with IDAHO R. Civ. P. 7(6)(1).
222. § 67-5206(4)(e). There are two kinds of service addressed by the Attorney
General's Rules: service by the agency itself upon the parties and service by the
parties upon one another.
Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule, the agency may serve rules,
notices, summonses, complaints, and orders by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to a party's last known mailing address or by personal service. IRAP
55. The choice of service by mail or personal service in the document initiating a
proceeding will often depend on the relationship between the agency and the
person who is a party before the agency. Regulatory agencies with authority over
persons holding licenses, permits, or certificates from the agency stand in a
different relationship to the regulated entity than the trial courts do to the general
public. Accordingly, it is common for these kinds of agencies to have rules
providing for service by mail to persons under their regulatory authority without
the necessity of personal service because those persons are subject to a statutory
requirement of regulation and supervision, by the agency. E.g., Public Utilities
Commission Rule of Procedure 16, IDAPA 31.01.01016 (1993). In instances like-
these, where there is a continuing relationship with a licensee, permittee, or
certificate holder, it is appropriate for the agency to initiate a contested case
against a licensee, permittee, or certificate holder by certified mail without
personal service. Regardless of how a party is initially given notice of the agency's
jurisdiction in a contested case, by mail or by personal service, the agency may
serve subsequent documents on the party by mail. IRAP 55.
223. § 67-5206(4)(f). The APA does not authorize any agency to issue
subpoenas, discovery orders, or protective orders; it merely authorizes the Attorney
General to prescribe procedures for the use of such powers "if authorized by other
provisions of law." Id. The legislature has not given subpoena and discovery
powers to every agency, and the APA does not do so. Under the Attorney
General's Rules, no party is entitled to engage in discovery unless some or all
parties agree that they may conduct discovery between themselves or the party
requesting discovery moves to compel discovery and the agency issues an order
doing so. IRAP 521. The Rules require that an order compelling discovery be
issued because most agencies do not have a statutory right of discovery. Agencies
whose organic statutes provide for discovery may adopt rules contrary to the
Attorney General's Rules. Regardless of the organic statute of the agency, however,
the parties may always agree among themselves that discovery will be available.
Id. Presumably, this agreement would be enforceable by the agency, particularly if
one side had already provided information under the agreement and the other side
then refused to comply. In general, the Rules recognize five types of discovery:
depositions, production requests or written interrogatories, requests for admission,
subpoenas, and statutory inspection, examination (including physical or mental
examination) investigation, etc. IRAP 520.01.
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b. Section 67-5242: Procedure at the Evidentiary Hearing
The goal of all contested case proceedings is "to assure that
there is a full disclosure of all relevant facts and issues."224 The
APA specifically obligates the presiding officer to conduct the
evidentiary hearing to assure this objective is met by "afford[ing] all
parties the opportunity to respond and present evidence and
argument on all issues"225 and "including such cross-examination as
may be necessary."
2 6
The APA requires the presiding officer to create a record of the
evidentiary hearing.227 A sound or video recording is sufficient; the
agency need not create a stenographic record. All or a part of the
hearing may be conducted by telephone, television, or other electronic
means. 
228
c. Section 67-5251: Evidence and Official Notice
The drafters of the APA adopted the clear trend in Idaho case
law22 and left the admission of evidence almost entirely to the
discretion of the presiding officer.23 ° Thus, a presiding officer is
authorized to exclude evidence that is irrelevant, unduly repetitious,
excludable on constitutional or statutory grounds, or the subject of an
evidentiary privilege provided by statute or recognized by courts.2
The officer may also receive evidence in written form 2 2 and may
224. § 67-5242(3)(a); see also IRAP 157, 558; cf. § 67-5241(1)(b) (allowing
paper hearings where this will not prejudice a party).
225. § 67-5242(3)(b); see also IRAP 157, 353.
226. § 67-5242(3)(a); see also IRAP 157, 558.
227. §§ 67-5242(3)(d), -5249(2)(e). The agency is required to record the hearing
at its own expense. § 67-5242(3)(d).
228. § 67-5242(3)(e); see also IRAP 552, 650 , cf. Dey v. Edward G. Smith &
Assocs. Inc., 110 Idaho 946, 948, 719 P.2d 1206, 1208 (1986) (while a telephone
conference call is a desirable method for holding hearings, the hearing must
provide "a complete [and] orderly basis for the resolution of the dispute.").
229. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 100 Idaho 659, 660-61, 603 P.2d
993, 994-95 (1979) (approving admission of hearsay); Guillard v. Department of
Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 650, 603 P.2d 981, 984 (1979) (endorsing the
informality of evidentiary rules in agency proceedings); Thom v. Callahan, 97 Idaho
151, 156-57, 540 P.2d 1330, 1337-38 (1975) (permitting use of leading questions);
State Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Engberg, 109 Idaho 530, 533-34, 708 P.2d 935,
938-39 (Ct. App. 1985) (break in chain of custody of physical evidence does not
preclude admission where other evidence establishes reliability).
230. See § 67-5251; see also IRAP 600-06.
231. § 67-5251(1); see also IRAP 600.
232. § 67-5251(2); cf. § 67-5241(1)(b) ("evidence ... may be received in
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accept copies of documentary evidence.233 The question to be decided
if the admissibility of evidence is challenged is not whether the
evidence is barred by an exclusionary rule such as hearsay, but
whether it is reliable and probative: "All... evidence may be
admitted if it is of a type commonly relied upon by prudent persons
in the conduct of their affairs."234 This reflects the fact that most
exclusionary rules are intended to insulate juries from prejudicial
information - a rationale that has no application where the fact-
finder is not a jury.
The APA also recognizes that an agency's experience, technical
competence, and specialized knowledge may be used in the evaluation
of evidence." This is an explicit statutory recognition that the
agency's repeated exposure to a specialized subject matter is a source
of specialized knowledge that is useful in evaluating evidence.
An agency's specialized knowledge also plays a role in
determining what evidence the agency may notice. Official notice is
broader than judicial notice; in addition to facts that can be judicially
noticed, an agency may take official notice of "generally recognized
technical or scientific facts within the agency's specialized
knowledge."23 The potential unfairness of the broader power to
notice facts is obviated by requiring the agency to notify the parties
of the facts that it intends to notice. The agency is required to give
notice that it is taking official notice as soon as practicable and must
provide parties with "a timely and meaningful opportunity to contest
and rebut the facts or material" noticed. 7 As a practical matter, an
agency that wishes to notice a matter that is debatable should
provide notice of its intent to do so before the evidentiary hearing. If
it does not do so, any party should be entitled to a continuance of the
written form if doing so will expedite the case without substantially prejudicing
the interests of any party.").
233. § 67-5251(3).
234. § 67-5251(1). The Attorney General's Rules provide:
Evidence should be taken by the agency to assist the parties' development
of a record, not excluded to frustrate that development. The presiding
officer at hearing is not bound by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. No
informality in any proceeding or in the manner of taking testimony
invalidates any order.
IRAP 600.
235. § 67-5251(5); see also IRAP 600.
236. § 67-5251(4)(b); see also IRAP 602. See generally Market St. Ry. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945) (discussing official notice). Cf State Dep't of
Law Enforcement v. Engberg, 109 Idaho 530, 533, 708 P.2d 935, 938 (Ct. App.
1985) (permitting agency to take official notice of defendant's liquor license).
237. § 67-5251(4); see also IRAP 602.
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hearing or to a second hearing at which its right "to contest and
rebut" the officially noticed facts can be exercised.
Furthermore, when the agency proposes to take official notice of
staff memoranda or data, a more stringent rule is applicable: "[A]
responsible staff member shall be made available for cross-
examination if any party so requests."238 This provision explicitly
precludes the practice of developing a factual record by memorandum
that is not made part of the record. Nevertheless, parties before an
agency would be well advised to request a copy of all staff
memoranda to be officially noticed long enough before the hearing to
determine whether deposition or cross-examination of a staff witness
is desired.
Finally, the difference between administrative and judicial
proceedings is also highlighted in the APA's provisions granting the
presiding officer the power to allow nonparties an opportunity to
present statements in a contested case.239 In many situations, the
public is keenly interested in the outcome of the administrative
proceedings and may have a statutory right to testify at public
hearings. While these "public witnesses"240 do not have parties'
rights to examine witnesses or otherwise participate in the contested
case, it is, nevertheless, often appropriate in an administrative
proceeding to take the testimony of the public. For example, in many
ratemaking or licensing decisions the public perception of the quality
and value of the service is relevant to the ultimate decision before
the agency. In such cases, the public witnesses may make written or
oral statements and introduce exhibits. If the presiding officer admits
the testimony of a public witness, the officer is required to give the
parties an opportunity to rebut the testimony.241
d. Section 67-5242: Procedures on Default of a Party
If a party fails to attend any stage of a contested case, the
presiding officer may serve a notice of proposed default order on all
parties." 2 The party who is proposed to be defaulted must petition
the presiding officer within seven days after service of the proposed
238. § 67-5251(4).
239. § 61-5242(3)(c).
240. The Attorney General's Rules define "public witnesses" as "persons [who
testify, but who are] not parties and not called by a party to testify at hearing."
IRAP 355.
241. § 61-5242(3)(c).
242. § 67-5242(4); see also IRAP 700-702 (provisions on default orders).
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order to request that the order be vacated.2 43 When a default order
is issued, the presiding officer is to conduct further proceedings in the
contested case without the participation of the defaulted party and
must determine all issues in the adjudication, including those affect-
ing the defaulted party.2"
4. Sections 67-5252 and 67-5253: Securing an
Unbiased Hearing
A fundamental tenet of due process is an unbiased
decisionmaker. Section 67-5252 on disqualification of presiding
officers and section 67-5253 on ex parte communications comprise the
core of the APA's impartiality requirements. These sections are
intended to ensure that the decisionmaker bases the order solely on
the facts and arguments contained in the record created at the
evidentiary hearing.
a. Section 67-5252: Disqualification of the Presiding Officer
The provisions on disqualification of the person assigned to
preside over the evidentiary hearing in a contested case have been
substantially changed. To appreciate the operation of the provisions
on disqualifications, it is necessary to begin by distinguishing three
terms: "presiding officer," "hearing officer," and "agency head." The
"presiding officer is the person who presides over the evidentiary
hearing in the contested case proceeding."24 There are two kinds of
presiding officers: a "hearing officer,"24 who is someone other than
the agency head, and the "agency head" itself.4 7  Different
243. § 67-5242(4).
244. Id.
245. Section 67-5242(2) specifies that the presiding officer may be the agency
head, one or more members of the agency head (where the agency head is a
multi-member body), or a "hearing officer" employed by the agency. § 67-5242(2).
Thus, as the term "presiding officer" is used in the APA, it includes both hearing
officers and agency heads. Determination of the identity of the presiding officer as
either a hearing officer or an agency head is important primarily because it
determines whether the first order is a "final order" or not. See §§ 67-5243, -5246.
246. The APA authorizes the Attorney General to set qualifications of hearing
officers. § 67-5206(4)(g). The rules specify that hearing officers may be employees
of the agency or independent contractors, that hearing officers may but need not
be attorneys, and that hearing officers who are not attorneys should ordinarily be
persons with technical expertise or experience in issues before the agency. IRAP
410. The rules also provide that the appointment of a hearing officer is a matter
of public record, available for inspection and copying. Id.
247. § 67-5242(2). The "agency head" is the "individual or body of individuals
in whom the ultimate legal authority of the agency is vested by any provision of
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disqualification rules potentially apply to these two categories of
presiding officers.
Hearing officers may be disqualified from hearing a contested
case without cause in two situations. First, each party has a right to
one disqualification without the need to specify cause.24 s The second
and the most significant expansion of the right to disqualify potential
hearing officers, however, is the provision allowing a party to assert a
blanket disqualification of all agency employees.249 There is one
exception to these broad rights to disqualify hearing officers without
cause: when state or federal statutes or regulations require a decision
to be rendered in a contested case within fourteen weeks of the date
of the request of the hearing, there is no right of disqualification of a
hearing officer without cause.25 ° This exception preserves the ability
of agencies such as the Department of Health and Welfare to comply
with the rigid federal guidelines for processing contested cases.
The APA also expands the types of "cause" that are sufficient to
disqualify a presiding officer. Hearing officers may be disqualified not
only for bias, prejudice, interest,25 ' substantial prior involvement in
the case other than as a presiding officer, or any other cause for
law." § 67-5201(4); see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (defining term
'agency head"). When the agency head is a multi-member board or commission,
the board or commission as a whole or an individual member or members of the
board or commission may be a presiding officer. When the members of a multi-
member board hear the case, the "presiding officer" is the panel rather than the
specific individual who actually wields the gavel. § 67-5242(2); see also IRAP 414
(defining "presiding officer").
248. § 67-5252(1); cf. IRCP 40(d)(1)-(2) (the grounds for disqualification of a
district judge or magistrate).
249. § 67-5252(2); see also IRAP 412 (disqualification of presiding officer).
250. § 67-5252(5).
251. § 67-5252(1). While the prohibition against biased, prejudiced, or
interested decisionmaker should be broadly construed to preclude even the
appearance of impropriety, the fact that an agency may perform more than a
single function is not in itself a cause for disqualification. Compare Manookian v.
Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, 701, 735 P.2d 1008, 1012 (1987) (prohibition against
interested decisionmakers "is essential because, under the Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act .... the findings of fact of an administrative agency are subject to
review only under the 'substantial evidence test' on appeal to a district court.")
with Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 801-02, 154 P.2d 156, 160
(1944) (the unemployment compensation act provides due process despite the
combination of functions performed by the agency because the agency "has no
personal interest in the controversy though its employees have made investigations
and orders . . . . The board is not in the true sense of the word an adversary.")
(citations omitted). See also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57 (1975) (holding
that combination of functions in administrative agency does not violate due
process).
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which a judge may be disqualified, but also for "lack of professional
knowledge in the subject matter of the contested case."252 These
rights of disqualification, particularly the right to disqualify all
agency employees, are unusually broad and have no parallel in the
federal or model state APAs.
The broad rights of disqualification of hearing officers do not
always extend to the agency head. While presiding officers who are
agency heads are subject to disqualification under the same
provisions as hearing officers, the APA includes a "rule of necessity":
when the disqualification of the agency head or a member of the
agency head would result in an inability to decide a contested case,
the person is not be disqualified and may decide the case. Rather
than disqualifying the decisionmaker and precluding a decision, the
APA requires the actions of the agency head to be treated as a
conflict of interest under the Ethics in Government Act.
2 53
The APA also sets out the procedure to be used by a party in
exercising its right to disqualify a presiding officer. The right to
disqualify all agency employees may be exercised without awaiting
the designation of a presiding officer;' indeed, this right should be
exercised as soon as a party is notified that a contested case has been
initiated. Other petitions for disqualification are to be filed within
fourteen days of notification of the identity of the presiding officer or
"promptly upon discovering facts establishing grounds for
disqualification."2" Petitions are to be filed with the officer whose
disqualification is sought; the officer is required to decide the petition
in writing and to include in that decision a statement of facts and
reasons.
256
b. Section 67-5253: Ex parte Contacts
The APA prohibits parties in contested cases from communica-
ting with the presiding officer in a contested case regarding the
substance of the contested case, except upon notice and opportunity
for all parties to participate in the communication. 257 There are
252. § 67-5252(1). On the grounds for disqualification of a district judge or
magistrate, see IRCP 40(d)(1)-(2).
253. § 67-5252(4). The Ethics in Government Act requires a decisionmaker to
disclose fully any potential conflict of interest to the person who appointed the
decisionmaker. See § 59-704(3).
254. § 67-5252(2).
255. Id. IRAP 550 requires the notice of hearing to include the name of the
presiding officer.
256. § 67-5252(3).
257. § 67-5253; see also IRAP 417 (ex parte communications).
1993-94]
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
three exceptions to this prohibition on ex parte communication. The
first is explicit: the prohibition does not apply to ex parte
communications specifically authorized by statute.258
In considering the second and third exceptions, it is helpful to
distinguish between procedure, law, and fact. The second exception is
found in the section's prohibition on ex parte communications
"regarding any substantive issue in the proceeding." 9 The section
thus does not prohibit communications on procedural matters. This
exception was included to allow the presiding officer to answer a
party's procedural questions. The Act's drafters were concerned that
a blanket prohibition on all ex parte communications would cause
problems particularly for pro se parties who may be unfamiliar with
the agency procedures; under the language of the section, parties are
free to contact the presiding officer to discuss procedural matters
such as scheduling hearings, filing documents, requesting discovery,
and the like.26
The third exception is also implicit in the section's language: it
is a prohibition on communications only with a "party."26 ' The term
is to be broadly construed to include any person interested in the
outcome of the contested case. It does not, however, include other
members of the hearings panel or their administrative assistants.6
This exception requires clarification because of the interaction of the
prohibition on ex parte communications with other statutory
provisions. Because a contested case is required to be decided solely
on the basis of the factual record compiled at the hearing,2" the
exception -for communicating with non-parties is more restrictive
than the terms alone might suggest. While the sheer variety of non-
parties prevents reliance on simple rules, the distinction between
"law" and "fact" does help to clarify the problem. Since the focus of
concern is that the presiding officer's decision be based on the facts in
the record, communications concerning the facts of a contested case
are more stringently restricted than are discussions of the law. The
situations form a continuum from the clearly permissible to the
equally clearly impermissible. For example, when the presiding
officer is a multi-member panel, discussions of factual and legal
issues among panel members are entirely permissible. At the other
258. § 67-5253 (emphasis added).
259. Id. A "substantive issue" is a conjunction of legal and factual questions,
and thus involves a blending of the law and fact categories.
260. See also IRAP 417 (ex parte communications).
261. § 67-5253.
262. See § 67-5253 cmt.
263. See §§ 67-5248(2), -5249(3), -5279(3) & cmt. 4.
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extreme, any discussions with other agency personnel who are
involved in the case are clearly impermissible. In situations falling
between the extremes, presiding officers and reviewing courts should
resolve specific questions bearing in mind that all factual
communications are a serious threat to the integrity of the decision.
In general, presiding officers and reviewing courts should err on the
side of prohibiting or revealing" ex parte communications.
5. Sections 67-5243 to 67-5247: The Variety of Orders
Idaho's APA creates a unique classification scheme of orders. It
provides for four kinds of orders: recommended orders, preliminary
orders, final orders, and emergency orders. The first three of these
types of orders - recommended orders, preliminary orders, and final
orders - are issued following the evidentiary hearing prescribed in
§§ 67-5242 and 67-5251 and are described here. These orders differ
only in the relationship between the "presiding officer" and the
"agency head."
The first two kinds of orders - recommended orders and prelim-
inary orders - are orders issued by a presiding officer who is
someone other than the agency head.2" The distinction between
recommended and preliminary orders is the degree of finality that is
attached to each; if the order does not become final until it has been
reviewed by the agency head, it is a "recommended order;"2 if the
order becomes final unless a party seeks review of the order, the
order is a "preliminary order."26 7
a. Section 67-5244: Recommended Orders
A recommended order cannot become a final order by itself; it
can become the agency's final order only if it is formally adopted as
such by the agency head.2 s Instead, a recommended order
264. The Attorney General's Rules seek to ameliorate the problem by
requiring a presiding officer to place any written ex parte communication into the
record and to provide all parties with copies of the communication. IRAP 417. Oral
communications should be treated similarly: a statement of the content of the
communication should be placed in the record and all parties should be informed
of the communication and allowed an opportunity to rebut it.
265. § 67-5243(1); see also supra notes 37-39 and 245-47 and accompanying
text.
266. § 67-5243(1)(a).
267. See § 67-5243(1)(b) & cmt. 2. The order (or a document accompanying it)
must identify the order as either a recommended or a preliminary order. § 67-
5243(2); IRAP 720.02.a, 730.02.a.
268. § 67-5244; see also IRAP 720 (requirements of Recommended Orders).
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automatically initiates an appellate-style administrative review."'
The recommended order, therefore, must include a briefing schedule
for review of the order by the agency head or its designee.270 This
type of contested case thus involves an evidentiary, trial-like hearing
before a hearing officer who prepares the recommended order that is
sent to all parties. A party may petition the hearing officer for
reconsideration of the decision271 or may object to it before the
agency head and brief the issues involved. 2 After reviewing the
recommended order, the agency head or its designee may issue a
final order, remand the matter for an additional hearing before a
presiding officer, or hold the additional hearing itself.273 If the
agency head determines that oral argument would be of assistance in
resolving the issues raised in the contested case, it may schedule
one.274 In reviewing a recommended order, the agency head need
not defer to the presiding officer's findings of fact; the APA explicitly
provides that the agency head "shall exercise all the decision-making
power that he would have had if the agency head had presided over
the hearing."275 Finally, the APA requires the agency head to act on
269. § 67-5244 (specifying the procedures to be followed in the administrative
review of recommended orders).
270. § 67-5244(1). The agency head may appoint soiheone to decide appeals of
the hearing officer's recommended order. IRAP 720.01.
271. § 67-5243(3); see also infra notes 295-97 and accompanying text (discus-
sing petitions for reconsideration).
272. § 67-5244(1); see also IRAP 720.02 (content requirements of recommended
order). The appellate review may be performed by the agency head's designee.
IRAP 720.01.
273. § 67-5244(2); see also IRAP 720.02.c (recommended order to include
briefing schedule).
274. § 67-5244(1). The agency head is not required to provide oral argument;
it may decide the issue solely on the basis of the record in the factual hearing,
the recommended order prepared by the presiding officer, and the briefs prepared
by the parties. Id.
275. § 67-5244(3) & cmt. 3. This provision codifies the conclusion of the case
law construing the old APA. As the Idaho Supreme Court had noted: "The district
court's perception that it was to review the Commission's reversal of the hearing
officer constituted a fundamental misconception of the relationship between the
hearing officer and the full Commission, and of its own function as a reviewing
court." Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 259, 715 P.2d 927, 929
(1986). The commission's decision was not a reversal of the hearing officer, "the
new decision effectively displaced the proposed decision of the hearing officer." Id.
That decision became the final agency decision and the court was to review the
final agency decision. Id.; see also Homer v. Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho
1111, 1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985); cf Department of Health & Welfare v.
Sandoval, 113 Idaho 186, 190, 742 P.2d 992, 996 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[Wlhere credi-
bility is crucial and where first-hand exposure to the witnesses may strongly affect
the outcome, we think the [agency head] should not override the [presiding]
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all recommended orders within eight weeks of the receipt of briefs or
oral argument.2 7 This is one of several time limits that are in-
cluded within the Act to ameliorate the recurrent claim that agencies
frequently move too slowly; the time limits can be enforced
judicially.277
The recommended order thus lacks any independent legal status;
it is simply one of the documents that comprise the record before the
decisionmaker.
2 78
b. Section 67-5245: Preliminary Orders
Preliminary orders, unlike recommended orders, become a* final
order of the agency unless the agency head, on its own motion or
upon petition of any party, agrees to review the preliminary
order.279 The APA recognizes two alternatives: the preliminary
order may be reviewable before the agency head or its designee at the
request of any party to the contested case or administrative review of
the preliminary order may be made entirely discretionary.28 ° The
final alternative is most likely to be used by those agencies such as
the Department of Health and Welfare that hear many contested
cases annually. With such a caseload, it is unrealistic to provide
review by the agency head as a matter of right. The APA therefore
allows an agency head to delegate its entire authority to a presiding
officer and thus to preclude any further, nondiscretionary
administrative review.281 Nonetheless, the crucial point is that,
when a hearing officer issues a preliminary order, further
administrative review is discretionary.
The APA requires the hearing officer, when issuing a prelim-
inary order, to inform the parties that the order will become final
"without further notice" and to include the steps that are necessary
to seek administrative review of the order.282 The Act itself specifies
that review must be sought by filing a petition with the agency head
officer's impressions unless it makes a cogent explanation of its reasons for doing
so. Such an explanation is essential to meaningful judicial review, and it is a
logical adjunct to the [agency head's] statutory duty to supplement its decisions
with findings of fact and conclusions of law.").
276. § 67-5244(2)(a).
277. The APA defines "agency action" to include "the failure to issue a rule or
order." § 67-5201(3)(b). Agency action is reviewable. § 67-5270(2).
278. § 67-5249(2)(e); see also Sandoval, 113 Idaho at 190, 742 P.2d at 996.
279. § 67-5243(1)(b); see also IRAP 730.01 (definition of "preliminary order").
280. See § 67-5245(2); see also IRAP 730 (preliminary orders).
281. § 67-5245(2)(b).
282. § 67-5245(1); see also IRAP 730.02.2 (notification language).
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within fourteen days of the issuance of the preliminary order" and
that the petition for review must state the reason for which review is
sought.2" If the agency head grants review, the procedure
corresponds to that used to review recommended orders: the agency
head is to establish a briefing schedule;2" oral argument is at the
discretion of the agency head;28 the agency head exercises "all of
the decision-making power that he would have had if the agency
head had presided over the hearing;"287 and the agency head is
required to act on all preliminary orders accepted for review within
eight weeks of the receipt of briefs or oral argument.2"
c. Section 67-5246: Final Orders
The last of the three alternative methods for issuing orders is for
the agency head to be the presiding officer at the evidentiary
hearing. In that case, the agency head issues a final order.289
Thus, there are four ways in which an order becomes a final
order. First, when it is issued by the agency head acting as presiding
officer.2"' Second, when the agency head issues a final order follow-
ing the mandatory review of a recommended order.291 Third, when
the period for petitioning for review of a preliminary order has run
without a petition for review being filed and granted with the agency
head.292 Fourth, when discretionary review of a preliminary order
has been granted and the agency head issues a final order." s Each
of these final orders is subject to judicial review.294
d. Sections 67-5243 and 67-5246: Petitions for Reconsideration
An important principle of administrative law is that the agency
should be given the first opportunity to correct its possible errors.
The APA's provisions for contested cases incorporate this principle by
explicitly authorizing petitions for reconsideration. Regardless of the
283. § 67-5245(3).
284. § 67-5245(4).
285. § 67-5245(5).
286. Id.
287. § 67-5245(7) & cmt. 6. See generally supra § 67-5244(3) (same language
in section covering recommended orders).
288. § 67-5245(6)(a).
289. § 67-5246(1); see also IRAP 740.
290. § 67-5246(1).
291. § 67-5246(2).
292. § 67-5246(3).
293. Id.
294. § 67-5270(3).
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kind of order, the presiding officer has authority to entertain
petitions for reconsideration of the order if the petition is filed within
fourteen days of the issuance of the order.295 While the filing of a
petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite to administrative or
judicial review of the order, the officer who issued the order will have
greater familiarity with the factual and legal issues than will other
potential decisionmakers. It is therefore far more efficient for all
parties to have that officer reconsider the order, particularly when
minor or technical problems arise.
A petition for reconsideration that is not acted upon within
twenty-one days is presumed denied.2" It is not necessary, however,
that the officer decide the issues presented by the petition within
twenty-one days; it is only necessary that the petition be accepted,
which can be accomplished through notification of the parties that
the officer will reconsider the order.297
e. Section 67-5246: Effective Dates
The APA also specifies when orders become "effective." Unless a
different date is stated in the final order, it becomes effective
fourteen days after it is issued.2 98 Effectiveness - as well as other
deadlines"' - is tolled if a petition for reconsideration has been
filed. 0°
While the variety of orders might initially sound complex and
confusing, the apparent complexity reflects variations on a simple
theme: the evidentiary hearing may be presided over either by
someone other than the agency head or by the agency head itself.30 .
295. §§ 67-5243(3), -5246(4); see also IRAP 720.02.a, 730.02.a, 740.02.a. This
provision reverses the holding in Department of Employment v. St. Aiphonsus
Hosp., 96 Idaho 470, 472, 531 P.2d 232, 234 (1975) (holding that an agency
without explicit statutory authorization to reconsider its orders was without
jurisdiction to do so). While the APA does not confer additional substantive
authority, it does authorize' additional procedural powers. Cf. § 67-5226(1)(b)-(c)
(temporary rules).
296. §§ 67-5243(3), -5246(4).
297. See Comments to Attorney General's Rules 710 through 789 ("Reconsider-
ation can be granted by issuing an order that says, The petition for
reconsideration is granted,' then proceeding to schedule further hearings, briefing,
etc., on reconsideration.").
298. § 67-5246(5).
299. For example, the fourteen days within which a party must seek review
of a preliminary order is tolled by the filing of a petition for reconsideration. § 67-
5245(3).
300. § 67-5246(5).
301. § 67-5242(2); see also supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text (discus-
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If the agency head presides over the reception of the evidence, the
order that is issued at the end of the proceeding is a final order.0 2
If the agency head does not preside over the reception of the
evidence, the order that is issued by the officer who does hear the
evidence either is subject only to discretionary review by the agency
head and thus becomes final with the passage of time (a preliminary
order)0 3 or is subject to mandatory review by the agency head and
thus never becomes the final order (a recommended order).0 4
Within this basic framework, the Act's other provisions apply
uniformly. For example, petitions for reconsideration always must be
filed within fourteen days of the issuance of the order and always are
deemed to have been denied if not acted upon within twenty-one
days.0 5 The different results arise from the various types of orders:
1. If a petition for reconsideration is filed with the hearing officer
within fourteen days of the issuance of a recommended order,
the briefing schedule included with the order is tolled until
either (a) twenty-one days passes without the presiding officer
having responded to the petition or (b) the officer, having
accepted it, resolves the issues it raises and issues a new
recommended order with a new briefing schedule.""
2. If a petition for reconsideration is filed with the hearing officer
within fourteen days of the issuance of a preliminary order, the
time limit for filing a petition for review of the order with the
agency head is tolled while the petition is pending or until it is
resolved. If the petition for reconsideration has not been acted
upon within twenty-one .days, the time limit for filing the
petition for review with the agency head begins to run."7
3. If a petition for reconsideration is filed with the agency head
following the issuance of a final order, the effectiveness of the
order is tolled for twenty-one days or, if the agency head accepts
the petition, until the agency head issues a new final order.0 8
An agency head may, of course, accept a petition for
reconsideration and summarily reaffirm its prior order.
sing procedures for disqualifying presiding officer).
302. § 67-5246(1).
303. § 67-5243(1)(b).
304. § 67-5243(1)(a). The agency head may, of course, adopt the hearing
officer's recommended order as the final order.
305. §§ 67-5243(3), -5246(4).
306. §§ 67-5243(3), -5244.
307. §§ 67-5243(3), -5245(3).
308. § 67-5246(5).
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f. Section 67-5247: Emergency Orders
In addition to the recommended, preliminary, and final orders
that are issued after the development of an evidentiary record, the
APA specifies procedures to be employed in emergency proceedings
when the agency may issue an order to address a "situation involving
an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare
requiring immediate agency action."" 9 In issuing an emergency
order, the agency is to take "only such actions as are necessary to
prevent or avoid the immediate danger."310 The agency can issue
the order without conducting a hearing, and the order is effective
upon issuance.3 1' While the agency is required to include a "brief,
reasoned statement to justify both the decision that an immediate
danger exists and the decision to take the specific action,"312 the
record before the agency (if there is one) need not constitute the
exclusive basis for agency action or for judicial review of that
action.313 After issding the emergency order, the agency is required
to initiate the procedures that would have been required but for the
immediate danger."4
It has long been recognized that the government possesses the
power to act summarily when there is an immediate danger to the
public health, safety, or welfare.315 For example, the director of the
Department of Water Resources is empowered to issue an order
requiring a cessation of activities that "involve an unreasonable risk
of... damage to life or property or subsurface, surface, or atmos-
pheric resources" from the construction or operation of a geothermal
or injection well.31 " Quarantines and seizures of adulterated foods
are other common examples of this power.317 The APA provides the
309. § 67-5247(1).
310. Id.
311. § 67-5247(3).
312. § 67-5247(2). The agency's brief statement must explain (1) why the
agency concluded that there was an emergency and (2) why it took the specific
action. Id.
313. § 67-5247(5).
314. § 67-5247(4).
315. See, e.g., Van Orden v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 102 Idaho 663,
666-67, 637 P.2d 1159, 1162-63 (1981); Porter v. City of Lewiston, 41 Idaho 324,
335-36, 238 P. 1014, 1017 (1925), appeal dismissed, 270 U.S. 671 (1926). See
generally North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (putrid
chickens may be seized and destroyed before giving a hearing to their owner).
316. § 42-4010(d).
317. See, e.g., § 25-307 (quarantine of diseased cattle); § 37-118(d) (seizure of
adulterated food); § 39-415 (public health quarantines).
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procedures that an agency is to employ when it exercises emergency
powers over an individual or an individual's property.
6. Section 67-5254: Actions Against Licensees
The APA specifically prohibits an agency from adversely
affecting many types of licenses without giving the licensees notice
and an opportunity for a contested case.31 The statutory prohibition
applies only to licenses of a continuing nature; it does not apply to
licenses that expire by their own terms at the end of a specified
period. 19 When the license is of a continuing nature and the
licensee makes a timely and sufficient application for a renewal, the
license does not expire until administrative and judicial review of the
contested case has been exhausted. 20
The protections accorded licensees are subject to two explicit
limitations. First, an agency may take immediate action against a
licensee if the agency is authorized to exercise emergency powers.321
Second, an agency may promulgate rules that affect classes of
licensees.322 For example, an agency may promulgate a rule estab-
lishing a new standard for holding a license without being required
to provide individualized contested cases for all licensees affected by
the rule.2 3
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that licenses
of a continuing nature are sufficiently akin to property to trigger due
process requirements. 24 While the Court has adopted a "flexible
due process" approach,3" for the substantial majority of govern-
mental programs only notice, an assurance of some degree of impar-
tiality, and a statement of the reasons for the decision are
required.3 2' The procedures specified in the contested case
318. § 67-5254. It should be noted that § 67-5254 does not create a different
type of order but merely specifies that a certain class of individuals - licensees -
are entitled to a contested case prior to certain types of agency actions.
319. Id.
320. § 67-5254(2).
321. § 67-5254(3)(a); see also § 67-5247 (emergency proceedings).
322. § 67-5254(3)(b).
323. E.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 628-29 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892,
895-96 (2d. Cir. 1960). See generally Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (distinguishing between legislative and
administrative process).
324. E.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1979); see also Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 570-71 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970).
325. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
326. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures,
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provisions of the APA thus easily satisfy the constitutional
requirements.
7. Section 67-5248: Required Contents of Orders
All orders, whether preliminary, recommended, final, or
emergency, must be in writing 27 and must contain two types of
information. First, each order must contain a reasoned statement in
support of the decision, including a concise and explicit statement of
the underlying facts supporting the findings. 28  Except for
emergency orders, findings of fact must be based exclusively on the
evidence in the record or on matters officially noticed.329 Second, the
order must include a statement of the available procedures for
seeking administrative or judicial review.330
8. Section 67-5249: Contested Case Record
To facilitate any subsequent administrative or judicial review of
the order, the agency is required to maintain the official record of
each contested case for at least six months after the expiration of the
last date for judicial review.331 The record must include all notices
of proceedings, pleadings, motions, briefs, petitions, and intermediate
rulings; evidence received or considered; a statement of matters
officially noticed; offers of proof and objections and rulings; the record
prepared by the presiding officer and any transcript of the record;
staff memoranda or data submitted to the presiding officer; and any
recommended order, preliminary order, final order, or order on
reconsideration. 3 2 The APA specifies that this record is to be the
agency record for judicial review of the order.33
43 U. CH. L. REV. 739 (1976).
327. § 67-5248(1).
328. § 67-5248(1)(a).
329. § 67-5248(2). The requirement that a contested case be based solely on
the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing is, of course, the defining
characteristic of the proceeding. See § 67-5249(3) & cmt.; cf § 67-5279(3)
(specifying scope of review when agency decision is required to be based on the
record compiled at an evidentiary hearing).
330. § 67-5248(1)(b); see also IRAP 720.02.a, 730.02.a, 740.02.a (requiring
order to identify whether it is preliminary, recommended, or final).
331. § 67-5249(1).
332. § 67-5249(2); see also IRAP 650 (specifying contents of record for decision
in a contested case).
333. § 67-5275(1)(b).
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9. Section 67-5250: Indexing Precedential Agency
Orders and Guidance Documents
In the discussions and hearings that were involved in the
drafting of the APA, a recurrent complaint was the difficulty in
determining what the agency would rely upon in deciding a specific
contested case. Numerous persons complained of "secret law" because
agency orders from previous contested cases and agency guidance
documents such as manuals, policy statements, and legal
interpretations were not readily available. The drafters of the APA
sought to rectify this problem by requiring an agency to index and
make available those orders upon which it intends to rely.334 The
index and the orders must be available to the public in the agency's
main and regional offices.335 The requirement is self-executing: an
agency is prohibited from relying upon an order as precedent in any
subsequent contested case unless the order has been indexed and is
available for public inspection.3 '
Agencies are also required to index and make their "guidance
documents" available to the public.337 The term is broadly defined to
include most documents "intended to guide agency actions affecting
the rights or interests of persons outside the agency."38 Three
points should be noted. First, "[tihe indexing of a guidance document
does not give that document the force and effect of law or other
precedential authority."339 Second, even though these documents do
not have the force and effect of law, as a practical matter those
subject to the agency's regulation may consider such documents to be
more important than orders, rules, or statutes because they are the
primary reference tools of the individuals actually doing the agency's
work. This provision assures the public a right of access to these
documents. Third, by requiring the documents to be indexed and
made available to the public, the APA effectively binds the agency to
comply with them since a reviewing court is unlikely to be persuaded
that an agency behaved reasonably if it violates its own policy. The
indexing requirements thus will operate to reduce an agency's ability
334. § 67-5250. To promote uniformity in indexing, the Administrative Rules
Coordinator is required to "establish a uniform indexing system for agency orders."
§ 67-5206(1)(d).
335. § 67-5250(1).
336. Id.
337. § 67-5250(2).
338. Id.
339. Id. While this follows from the fact that the documents are neither rules
nor orders, the APA explicitly states this point to avoid ambiguity.
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to act arbitrarily by requiring it to reveal its operating policies to the
public.
10. Section 67-5255: Declaratory Rulings
The final provision in the part of the APA concerned with
contested cases gives any person a right to petition the agency for
declaratory ruling on the applicability of any order issued by the
agency. 40 This provision is intended to ensure that an individual
has an expeditious method for determining whether an agency order
is applicable to the person. A petition for a declaratory ruling does
not prevent the agency from initiating a contested case in the
matter. 4 ' A declaratory ruling on the applicability of an order is a
final agency action for purposes of judicial review.342
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The fourth part of the APA - §§ 67-5270 to 67-5279 - contains
the provisions governing judicial review of agency actions. The new
APA contemplates several kinds of review of agency actions:
traditional appellate review of contested cases based upon a
record; 343 review of substantive or procedural challenges to
rules;344 declaratory judgments by the district court on the validity
or applicability of agency rules;34 and review of an agency action
that is neither order nor rule.3 " The Act significantly expands both
the individuals entitled to obtain review of agency actions and the
number of agency actions subject to review under the APA. In the
words of the leading study on the role of judicial review in
administrative law, "[tihe availability of judicial review is the
necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, for a system of
administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally
valid." 7 By expanding judicial review of agency actions, the new
APA may contribute to an increased perception of the legitimacy of
administrative agencies.
340. § 67-5255.
341. § 67-5255(2).
342. § 67-5255(3).
343. See §§ 67-5270(3), -5279(3).
344. See §§ 67-5231, -5270(2), -5279(2).
345. See § 67-5278.
346. See §§ 67-5270(2), -5279(2).
347. Louis L. JAFFE, JuDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATVE ACTION 320
(1965).
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A. The Right to Judicial Review
Judicial review of agency' action involves an amalgam of
constitutional, statutory, and common law principles. While the focus
of this article is on the APA and a thorough analysis of the non-
statutory aspects of judicial review will not be presented, some
discussion of the constitutional and common-law components is
necessary to place the APA's provisions in context.
1. A Constitutional Note
Unlike the federal Constitution - which created a government
possessing only those powers granted to it by the Constitution"" -
"the State Constitution is a limitation, not a grant, of power."349
Thus, the state government has all powers not denied it by either the
Idaho or the United States Constitutions. The court is to look to the
state constitution to determine, not what it may do, but what it may
not do - and the Idaho Constitution imposes few limits on the
judicial power."'0 For example, while the legislature has the power
to prescribe the jurisdiction of the courts other than the supreme
court,3"' it has an affirmative constitutional obligation to provide for
348. E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06 (1819).
349. Eberle v. Nielson, 78 Idaho 572, 578, 306 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1957); see
also Diefendorf v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 637, 10 P.2d 307, 314 (1932); Idaho Power
& Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 241, 141 P. 1083, 1088 (1914).
350. See generally Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Idaho
133, 136, 666 P.2d 1144, 1147 (1983) ("[Tlhis Court has inherent power to render
decisions regarding Idaho law."). The most thoughtful examination of the authority
of the court to exercise all judicial power not prohibited to it is Justice Taylor's
dissenting opinion in In re Petition of Idaho State Fed'n of Labor, 75 Idaho 367,
378, 272 P.2d 707, 714 (1954) (Taylor, J., dissenting) (" 'The judicial power' means
all the judicial power and cannot be construed to mean only a part thereof. Nor
can it mean all of the power, subject to reservations or restrictions nowhere
expressed . . . . Accordingly the courts are free to exercise any power, properly
belonging to the judicial department, subject only to the limitations contained in
the federal and state constitutions.").
351. Article V, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides:
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a court for the trial of
impeachments, a Supreme Court, district courts, and such other courts
inferior to the Supreme Court as established by the legislature. The courts
shall constitute a unified and integrated judicial system for administration
and supervision by the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of such inferior
courts shall be as prescribed by the legislature.
IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 2. Similarly, article V, § 20 provides: "The district court
shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such
appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 20.
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"a proper system of appeals.""2 As applied to administrative
agencies, the court has held that the state constitution grants the
legislature power to create boards that adjudicate due process
interests, but due process requires judicial review of agency
decisionmaking when a common law, statutory, or constitutional
right is at stake.353
This does not mean, however, that the legislature is required to
provide for de novo review of agency decisionmaking. Its power to
determine "such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by
law"354 authorizes the legislature to impose some limitations on
judicial review of agency action by the district courts. For example, in
Swisher v. State Department of Environmental & Community
Services, the court held that, when a "statute provides that on appeal
from [an agency] the district court may only affirm or set aside
orders of the [agency] or remand the matter to the [agency], the
district court has no jurisdiction to enter any other orders or take
further evidence on matters not considered by the [agency] .""
Thus, the district court's appellate jurisdiction may be defined by statute. See
Swisher v. State Dep't of Envtl. & Community Servs., 98 Idaho 565, 567 n.1, 569
P.2d 910, 912 n.1 (1977).
352. IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 13. The section states: "The legislature shall have
no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which
rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the
legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals." Id. The supreme court has
held that this section imposes "a mandatory duty for the legislature to afford a
proper system of appeals to all courts below the Supreme Court." State v. Finch,
79 Idaho 275, 283, 315 P.2d 529, 533 (1957).
353. "It is clear in Idaho . . . that unless an appeal is provided from the
decision of an administrative body to a court of law, due process has not been
satisfied." Graves v. Cogswell, 97 Idaho 716, 717, 552 P.2d 224, 225 (1976); see
also Finch, 79 Idaho at 283, 315 P.2d at 533; Electors of Big Butte Area v. State
Bd. of Educ., 78 Idaho 602, 610-11, 308 P.2d 225, 230-31 (1957); Idaho Mut.
Benefit Ass'n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 801-03, 154 P.2d 156, 160-61 (1944); cf.
Fischer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Idaho 197, 199-200, 687 P.2d 587, 599-600
(Ct. App. 1984) (when right is solely a creature of statute, claimant must comply
with statutory provisions). When it is an agency action that affects a protected
interest, the APA generally will provide standards governing the scope of this
constitutionally mandated review. When the APA is inapplicable, the constitution
itself prohibits arbitrary or irrational decisionmaking. E.g., Electors of Big Butte
Area, 78 Idaho at 611-12, 308 P.2d at 230-31.
354. IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 20 ("The district court shall have . . . such
appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law.").
355. 98 Idaho 565, 567 n.1, 569 P.2d 910, 912 n.1 (1977); see also
Intermountain Gas Co. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 97 Idaho 113, 129-30, 540
P.2d 775, 791-92 (1975). The sufficiency of the evidence is, of course, a question of
law.
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Although there obviously are boundary problems and areas of
overlap among legislative, executive, and judicial powers,"' the
passage of the APA has rendered the more difficult of questions moot,
since its provisions on judicial review expand both the types of
agency decisions that are subject to judicial review and the persons
who may obtain review. As a result, there should be no due process
problems in cases arising under the APA's review provisions because
the legislature has created a system that more than satisfies the
constitutional minima.
2. Section 67-5270: The Right of Judicial Review under the APA
Unlike the former APA - which provided for judicial review
only of contested cases357 - the new APA provides for judicial
review of all "agency actions," a term the Act defines broadly to
encompass deciding or failing to decide a contested case, issuing or
failing to issue a rule, and acting or failing to act under a statutory
duty.35 Thus, judicial review is now available not only of orders
issued in contested cases, but also of rules and other agency
decisions.359
Judicial review under the APA now includes agency actions
other than the issuance of orders. The distinction between orders and
other agency actions nevertheless has continuing relevance in
relation to what individuals may obtain judicial review: although any
person aggrieved by a final action other than an order is entitled to
judicial review, only a party aggrieved by a final order is entitled to
judicial review of the order under the APA.50
356. As the court has recognized, "[ilt is not always possible to draw a sharp
line of distinction between legislative, judicial and executive powers or functions,
nor does it appear necessary to the purpose of the constitutional separation of
powers, to do so." Electors of Big Butte Area, 78 Idaho at 607, 308 P.2d at 228.
357. Act of March 29, 1965, ch. 273, § 15, 1965 Idaho Sess. Laws 701, 709
(formerly codified at § 67-5215); see also Hoppe v. Nichols, 100 Idaho 133, 137,
594 P.2d 643, 647 (1979) (agency decision was not a "contested case" and therefore
no judicial review was available).
358. § 67-5201(3); see also discussion supra part II.A.3 (discussion of terms
'agency action," "order," "rule," "contested case," and "rulemaking").
359. As the comments to the APA note: "It is important to distinguish
between availability of review and likelihood of success on the merits. The Act
limits the scope of judicial review rather than precluding review of agency actions."
§ 67-5201 cmt. 3. The drafters of the Act chose to make most agency decisions
reviewable, but to restrict the scope of judicial review.
360. §§ 67-5243(3), -5246(4). The APA defines "person" to mean "any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision or
agency, or public or private organization or entity of any character." § 67-5201(13);
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B. Threshold Requirements for Judicial Review of Agency Actions
The right to judicial review of agency action has traditionally
been conditioned upon satisfaction of several timing requirements.
Along with the timing of review, the Idaho appellate courts appear to
have added an issue: standing to obtain review. The various timing
doctrines - exhaustion of administrative remedies, finality, primary
jurisdiction, and ripeness - focus on whether review may be had at
a particular time because the agency has not finished with the issue
(exhaustion and finality), the matter should be decided by an agency
before it is brought to a court (primary jurisdiction), or because the
question is premature (ripeness).
1. Section 67-5270 and "Standing" to Obtain Judicial Review
Standing has been developed in the federal courts as a doctrine
that determines the interests that may obtain judicial review of
agency action under the United States Constitution. Since the 1970s,
the United States Supreme Court has developed increasingly
elaborate and manipulable variations on the idea that the federal
courts have jurisdiction only to hear certain enumerated "cases and
controversies.""' To ensure that this jurisdictional requirement is
satisfied, the Court requires the type of concrete adverseness that
comes when a person has suffered an "injury in fact, economic or
otherwise" caused by the agency action." 2 The evolution of the
doctrine has been almost universally condemned by commenta-
tors"0 because the Court frequently manipulates the doctrine,
see also § 67-5270(2) (judicial review of agency action other than an order issued
in a contested case). "Party," on the other hand, is defined as "each person or
agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right
to be admitted as a party." § 67-5201(12); see also § 67-5270(3) (right of judicial
review of a contested case). The final clause ensures that a person who is denied
intervention in a contested case may obtain judicial review to determine whether
the agency properly denied the petition to intervene. See generally supra notes 65-
66 and accompanying text (discussing terms "party" and "person").
361. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to" certain
enumerated "cases" and "controversies").
362. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152
(1970). The Court has consistently tied its standing jurisprudence to the
jurisdictional requirements of Article III of the United States Constitution. See,
e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143-46 (1992); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
363. E.g., Abram Chayes, Foreword, Public Litigation and the Burger Court,
96 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a Standing
Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 KY. L.J. 185 (1980);
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finding standing when it wishes to reach the substantive issues"
and a lack of standing when it does not."
Surprisingly the Idaho courts appear to have adopted at least
some of the federal jurisprudence on standing"' - with the same
unpredictable and manipulable results."' The court has as yet not
provided a rationale for adopting the federal decisions, much less
attempted to explain why a doctrine grounded on the limited grant of
judicial power to the federal government is applicable in a court
system without any corresponding limitation on jurisdiction. The
Idaho courts are, after all, courts of general jurisdiction; the Idaho
Constitution vests the "judicial power of the state" in the courts
without limitation.3 Thus, if a case involves "judicial power" - as
Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A Functional Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973); Mark Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for
Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977); Jonathan D. Varat, Variable
Justiciability and the Duke Power Case, 58 TEx. L. REV. 273 (1980).
364. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. 2130. Compare Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) with Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) and
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., Inc., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
365. E.g., Lujan, 112 S. Ct. 2130; Valley Forge College v. Americans United,
454 U.S. 464 (1982); Simon, 426 U.S. 26.
366. See, e.g., Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho
573, 584-85, 850 P.2d 724, 735-36 (1993); Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 118 Idaho
136, 139-40, 795 P.2d 298, 301-02 (1990); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho
635, 640-42, 778 P.2d 757, 762-64 (1989); Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass'n v.
Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 87-89, 675 P.2d 344, 347-49 (Ct. App. 1984).
367. Compare Miles, 116 Idaho- at 640-42, 778 P.2d at 762-64 (ratepayer has
standing to sue utility because harm different than all state residents) and Alpert,
118 Idaho at 139-40, 795 P.2d. at 301-02 (ratepayer has standing to sue city
because harm different from all state residents even though harm identical to all
city residents) with Bopp v. City of Sandpoint, 110 Idaho 488, 489-90, 716 P.2d
1260, 1261-62 (1986) (taxpayer and city resident has no standing to sue city for
vacating street because harm no different than other city residents and taxpayers)
and compare Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club, Inc., 81 Idaho 393, 397-98,
342 P.2d 719, 722 (1959) (taxpayer and city resident has no standing to sue city
for disannexing golf course because harm no different from other city residents and
taxpayers) with Bentel v. County of Bannock, 104 Idaho 130, 135-36, 656 P.2d
1383, 1388-89 (1983) (county residents have no standing to sue city despite
particularized harm because not city residents).
368. IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 2; see Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins.
Co., 105 Idaho 133, 666 P.2d 1144 (1983); Eismann v. Miller, 101 Idaho 692, 619
P.2d 1145 (1980); State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 539 P.2d 604 (1975).
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contrasted with legislative369 or executive37 power - the court
has jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter.371
Fortunately, the APA has mooted the standing question in
challenges to agency action. The APA's judicial review provisions
confer standing to obtain judicial review on a broad range of persons
representing a broad range of interests.372 The Act provides: "A
person aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a
contested case [or a] party aggrieved by a final order in a contested
369. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1.
370. See IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 5 (vesting the "supreme executive power" in
the governor; other powers are vested in other officers of the "executive depart-
ment").
371. The type of problem that the uncritical acceptance of federal precedent
creates is demonstrated in the court's recurrent statement that taxpayers lack
standing. E.g., Alpert, 118 Idaho at 139, 795 P.2d at 301; Miles, 116 Idaho at 642,
778 P.2d at 764; Bopp, 110 Idaho at 490, 716 P.2d at 1262. In addition to offering
no reasons for the statement, the court has failed to acknowledge that taxpayers
have often been held to have standing in the state courts. In Nuckols v. Lyle, 8
Idaho 589, 592, 70 P. 401, 401-02 (1902), for example, plaintiff contended that a
contract entered into by the school board was void. When he sought an injunction,
defendants argued that he "was not a proper party" to "commence the action." Id.
The court specifically rejected the argument: "The complaint shows that he is a
taxpayer of the county and school district; hence he could commence and prosecute
this action." Id.; See BERNARD ScHwARTz, ADMINISTRATVE LAw § 8.15 (3d ed.
1991); see also, e.g., Sanborn v. Pentland, 35 Idaho 639, 643-44, 208 P. 401, 401
(1922) (taxpayer in highway district has standing to sue to recover monies paid to
district commissioner); Dunn v. Sharp, 4 Idaho 98, 103-04, 35 P. 842, 844 (1894)
(taxpayer has standing to challenge letting of contract to construct state wagon
road); Orr v. State Bd. of Equalization, 3 Idaho 190, 193-94, 28 P. 416, 417 (1891)
(taxpayer has standing to challenge legality of Board's action despite indeterminate
effect).
Furthermore, to the extent that "judicial power" is informed by the powers
of the King's Bench, it is clear that the judicial power was available to restrain
illegal actions at the insistence of strangers through recourse to the prerogative
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto. There is, in short, no
historical basis for requiring any injury much less an injury that differs from that
of other taxpayers. See Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); David Currie,
Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 41; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to
Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1265 (1961).
372. § 67-5270 cmt. 1; cf 2 COOPER, supra note 177, at 536 (noting that the
provision in the first model state APA upon which the current Idaho language is
based is significantly different from the federal APA and "goes. much further in
conferring standing to appeal"); id. at 538 (noting that state courts construing the
provisions "recognize standing to appeal on the part of any appellant-who shows in
fact that he is aggrieved by the administrative order"). The Court of Appeals per
curiam decision in Fox v. Board of County Comm'rs, 114 Idaho 940, 942, 763 P.2d
313, 315 (Ct. App.), is incorrect in its unsupported assertion on the APA and
standing, even under the former APA at issue in Fox.
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case.., is entitled to judicial review" under the APA if the person or
the party "complies with the requirements of Sections 67-5271
through 67-5279.""'3 Thus, the APA establishes a minimal threshold
for standing to obtain review of agency action other than an order:
whether the person was "aggrieved" by the action. The court has
previously defined "aggrieved" by a decision as "injuriously affected"
by the decision."' Thus, if a person has in fact been injured by the
agency's decision, that person has standing to obtain judicial review
of the decision.
2. Timing: Primary Jurisdiction, Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies, Finality, and Ripeness
The various doctrines that determine whether a person may
obtain judicial relief at a given point in a proceeding arise from
common concerns on the proper relationship between courts and
agencies. The timing doctrines are not jurisdictional because they are
not concerned with whether the petitioner is ever entitled to judicial
review,375 but only with when review is available. The answer to
this question is to be found in four overlapping doctrines: primary
jurisdiction - a plaintiff who has filed a traditional lawsuit may be
required to postpone that action while awaiting an agency's decision
on some or all of the issues; exhaustion of administrative remedies -
the petitioner must complete all administrative review before seeking
judicial review; finality - the agency action must be a "final agency
action" before an aggrieved person is entitled to judicial review of the
373. § 67-5270(2)-(3) (emphasis added). The Public Utilities Commission and
the Industrial Commission are explicitly excluded from the Act's judicial review
provisions. The final orders of these two commissions are. excluded because their
orders may be appealed directly to the Idaho Supreme Court. See IDAHO CONST.
art. V, § 9 (providing for direct appeal of "orders" issued by the two commissions);
§ 67-5270(3) (excluding the Public Utilities Commission and the Industrial
Commission from judicial review provisions of the APA). By implication from the
specific exclusion in § 67-5270(3) and the silence in § 67-5720(2), it appears that
rules or other agency actions of the two commissions are subject to review in
district court. See also Rhodes v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Idaho Sup. Ct. Rep. 1417,
1417 (1993) (allowing use of writ of prohibition to obtain review of Industrial
Commission rulemaking).
374. § 67-5270 cmt. 1; Roosma v. Moots, 62 Idaho 450, 455, 112 P.2d 1000,
1002 (1941); see also In re Blades, 59 Idaho 682, 684, 86 P.2d 737, 738 (1939).
This does not require injury to a legal interest.
375. E.g., Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627-29, 586 P.2d
1068, 1071-73 (1978) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive
court of jurisdiction); Grever v. Idaho Tel. Co., 94 Idaho 900, 902-03, 499 P.2d
1256, 1258-59 (1972) (doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not jurisdictional).
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action; and, ripeness - the agency action, even if "final," is
nonetheless premature.
a. Primary Jurisdiction
In some circumstances a plaintiff who has filed a traditional
lawsuit will be required to postpone that action while seeking an
agency's decision on some or all of the matters at issue in the
litigation. This is the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction,"37 6 a doctrine
used by courts to assign initial decisionmaking in areas where agency
and judicial jurisdiction to decide issues and disputes overlap. Thus,
the doctrine applies only when a claim can originally be brought
before either the court or an agency, and the moving party has
chosen to bring the matter to the court. For example, in Grever v.
Idaho Telephone Co., 77 the telephone company and plaintiffs
predecessor had agreed to terminate service to a resort and hotel.378
After plaintiff purchased the resort, he requested restoration of the
service.379 Defendant not only refused to restore service, it also
removed the existing telephone line and facilities, and then
demanded a $3,000 hookup charge.' Plaintiff brought an action in
district court seeking a writ of mandate to compel the phone company
to provide service.3"' The supreme court affirmed the district court's
dismissal so that the matter could be brought before the public
utilities commission:
In view of the fact that the Idaho Public Utilities Commission
has been vested with jurisdiction to regulate and supervise
public utilities in the state, it has been given power to
"prescribe rules and regulations for the performance of any
service or the furnishing of any commodity supplied by a
public utility," and it is the duty of the Commission to assure
that adequate service is furnished. The Idaho Public Utilities
Commission is the body that has primary jurisdiction in
matters such as the case at bar and that the plaintiff must
376. See 2 COOPER, supra note 177, at 562-72; SCHWARTZ, supra note 371, at
§§ 8.27-.32; PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES 235 (1989).
377. 94 Idaho 900, 499 P.2d 1256 (1972).
378. Id. at 901, 499 P.2d at 1257.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381.' Id.
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exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial
relief.82
The Grever court emphasized the expertise of the agency as the
basis for its decision.3" The other primary rationale for the doctrine
is to assure uniformity in the application of regulatory and
ratemaking laws - a rationale relied on by the court in Briggs v.
Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co.,"' where the supreme court
instructed the district court to determine whether it should defer to
the Idaho Department of Water Resources "to further the goal of
uniformity of method of determination of underground water rights
in all judicial and administrative hearings. " "
The APA only indirectly interacts with the common-law doctrine
of primary jurisdiction. Section 67-5278 authorizes any person to
petition the district court for declaratory judgment on the validity or
applicability of an agency rule.386 This provision was not intended
to restrict the district court's authority under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction to defer action on the petition and await clarification of
the issues by the agency.3"7
382. Id. at 902, 499 P.2d at 1258 (footnote omitted).
383. Id.; see also Briggs v. Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427,
435 n.6, 546 P.2d 382, 390 n.6 (1976); Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575,
584-85, 513 P.2d 627, 636-37 (1973).
384. 97 Idaho 427, 546 P.2d 382 (1976).
385. Id. at 435-36 n.6, 546 P.2d at 390-91 n.6. Unfortunately, the court has
been far from consistent in its application of the doctrine. Compare Lemhi Tel. Co.
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 98 Idaho 692, 696, 571 P.2d 753, 757 (1977)
(construing contractual term "industry recognized practices" is for the court rather
than the agency even though tariff affected) with Alpert v. Boise Water Corp, 118
Idaho 136, 142-45, 795 P.2d 298, 304-07 (1990) (constitutionality of franchise fees
charged by the city presented only legal issues that had no effect on the
allocational aspects of the company's tariff structure). See also Anderson v. Gailey,
97 Idaho 813, 825, 555 P.2d 144, .156 (1976) (recognizing doctrine's potential
applicability to tort action).
386. § 67-5278(1); cf Swisher v. State Dep't of Envtl. & Community Servs., 98
Idaho 565, 567 n.1, 569 P.2d 910, 912 n.1 (1977) (the legislature has the
constitutional authority under article V, § 20 to specify the appellate jurisdiction of
the district courts).
387. See § 67-5278 cmt. 1; see also Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Robison, 65
Idaho 793, 803, 154 P.2d 156, 161 (1944) (district court had jurisdiction to
determine facial constitutionality of statute but not to determine whether the
statute applied to petitioner; jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the
statute belonged in the first instance to the agency charged with administering the
statute).
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b. Section 67-5271 and Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies
Primary jurisdiction applies to claims that can originally be
brought before either the court or an agency; the issue is whether the
agency should be afforded the first opportunity to decide the issue.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the other hand, becomes
an issue when an action was initially begun by or before an
administrative agency and the petitioner seeks judicial relief before
the administrative process has been finished. 8 s Primary
jurisdiction thus is concerned with initial jurisdiction, while
exhaustion focuses on when review of an agency action may be had.
The net effect of the two doctrines is that an "administrative agency
is entitled to the first and the next-to-last word." 9
The fundamental principle that a person is required to comply
with an agency's review procedures before seeking judicial relief is
codified in the APA: "A person is not entitled to judicial review of an
agency action until that person has exhausted all administrative
remedies."3" The exhaustion doctrine is one of comity for allocating
responsibilities between agencies and courts. It reflects two
interrelated goals. The first is to protect agency autonomy by
allowing it to develop a factual record, to apply its expertise to the
facts and issues, to detect and correct errors in its decisions, and to
determine policy issues; the second objective is to acknowledge the
respective competence of agency and judicial decisionmakers by
allowing the agency to develop fully the factual basis for appeal and
388. Labeling confusions do arise. For example, in Fischer v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 107 Idaho 197, 687 P.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1984), plaintiff had brought a claim
under a state statute prohibiting age discrimination. Id. at 198, 687 P.2d at 588.
The statute provided that a claim was to be filed with the Department of Labor
and Industrial Services. Id. When plaintiff sought to initiate a claim in district
court, the court of appeals held that the Department "was vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine age discrimination complaints." Id. at 199, 687 P.2d at
589. Since the claim could not be brought in the district court, the case 'did not
involve a question of primary jurisdiction but instead one of statutory limits on
the district court's appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 200, 687 P.2d at 590.
389. 2 COOPER, supra note 177, at 572; see 2 COOPER, supra note 177, at 572-
85; SCHWARTZ, supra note 371, at §§ 8.33-40; STRAUSS, supra note 376, at 232-33.
390. § 67-5271(1).
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to crystallize the legal issues involved.39 The doctrine thus reflects
a more general prohibition against piece-meal litigation.
Exhaustion becomes an issue in a case when an agency has
initiated an action and the entity that is the object of the agency
action seeks to obtain judicial review.392 A classic example of the
doctrine was presented in Idaho Mutual Benefit Association v.
Robison.3 93 The case was a declaratory judgment action initiated by
an insurance company that had been notified by the Industrial
Accident Board that it would be required to pay unemployment
compensation premiums on its agents.3" Petitioner sought a ruling
that the Unemployment Compensation Act was facially
unconstitutional and that, even if the Act were constitutional, it did
not apply to the petitioner's agents.395 The Board claimed that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the company
had not exhausted the available administrative remedies.3 96 The
supreme court disagreed, concluding that the facial constitutionality
of the Act was properly a judicial question that could be decided in
391. E.g., Grever v. Idaho Tel. Co., 94 Idaho 900, 903-04, 499 P.2d 1256,
1259-60 (1972); Williams v. State, 95 Idaho 5, 8, 501 P.2d 203, 206 (1972); Pounds
v. Denison, 115 Idaho 381, 384, 766 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1988); Ashley v.
Department of Health & Welfare, 108 Idaho 1, 2, 696 P.2d 353, 354 (Ct. App.
1985).
392. Several Idaho cases speak of either exhaustion or finality or both in the
context of what should more accurately be called estoppel or res judicata/claim
preclusion. Generally dismissal for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies
simply requires the petitioner to return to the agency to pursue additional agency
action. In some situations, however, the petitioner has delayed too long and is
really seeking to attack the agency decision collaterally. For example, in Henderson
v. State, 110 Idaho 308, 715 P.2d 978 (1986), plaintiff had been fired and did not
appeal an intermediate agency decision upholding his dismissal. Id. at 309, 715
P.2d at 979. He then subsequently filed a tort action for wrongful discharge. Id.
The court dismissed his claim, noting "Henderson had thirty days to appeal the
decision of the personnel commission. He did not do so. As a result, the decision
of the personnel commission became final . . . and the doctrine of res judicata
applies to bar his claim for wrongful discharge." Id. at 310, 715 P.2d at 980
(footnote omitted); see also Service Employees Int'l Union v. Idaho Dep't of Health
& Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 761, 683 P.2d 404, 409 (1984); V-1 Oil Co. v. County of
Bannock, 97 Idaho 807, 810, 554 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1976); Franden v. Jonasson, 95
Idaho 792, 793, 520 P.2d 247, 248 (1973); Mosman v. Mathison, 90 Idaho 76, 84-
85, 408 P.2d 450, 454-55 (1965); State v. Concrete Processors, Inc., 85 Idaho 277,
282, 379 P.2d 89, 91 (1963); Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 236, 786
P.2d 1136, 1138 (Ct. App. 1990); Pounds, 115 Idaho 381, 383, 766 P.2d 1262, 1264
(Ct. App. 1988).
393. 65 Idaho 793, 154 P.2d 156 (1944).
394. Id. at 797, 154 P.2d at 157-58.
395. Id. at 797, 154 P.2d at 158.
396. Id. at 797, 803, 154 P.2d at 158, 161.
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the first instance by the court in a declaratory judgment action.397
The issues surrounding the application of the Act to the company,
however, were properly for the Board. The district court lacked
jurisdiction
to determine whether or not appellant or its agents were
within the scope of the act, since [those issues] involve fact
finding. In other words we hold that the district court had
jurisdiction to construe the law and pass upon its
constitutionality, but that it had no jurisdiction to investigate
the facts, to make findings thereon or to determine the weight
of the evidence or credibility of witnesses .... These were
questions to be determined by the Industrial Accident Board
in the first instance and are reviewable on appeal.398
As a general principle, once an agency begins an investigation or files
a contested case, the other party is prohibited from obtaining judicial
review of the agency's jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding. 39
Similarly, where an application for benefits has been rejected, the
applicant must exhaust the available agency appeals before seeking
judicial relief.4
As the Robison case demonstrates, exhaustion is not required
when the issue is a facial constitutional challenge to the agency.
Because the exhaustion requirement can work a substantial
hardship, the courts have created other exceptions:
Illustrative of the circumstances which require an exception to
the exhaustion doctrine include: (1) where resort to
administrative procedures would be futile; (2) where the
aggrieved party is challenging the constitutionality of the
agency's actions or the agency itself; or (3) where the
aggrieved party has no notice of the initial administrative
decision or no opportunity to exercise the administrative
review procedures." 1
397. Id. at 803, 154 P.2d at 161.
398. Id. (citations omitted).
399. E.g., Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627-29, 586 P.2d
1068, 1071-73 (1978); Bohemian Breweries v. Koehler, 80 Idaho 438, 446-47, 332
P.2d 875, 879-80 (1958).
400. E.g., Franden v. Jonasson, 95 Idaho 792, 793, 520 P.2d 247, 248 (1973)
(action to have real property taxes apportioned); Williams v. State, 95 Idaho 5, 8,
501 P.2d 203, 206 (1972) (application for relocation benefits).
401. Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 236, 786 P.2d 1136, 1138
(Ct. App. 1990); see also Granata, 99 Idaho at 629, 586 P.2d at 1073 (agency
action threatens irreparable harm); Williams, 95 Idaho at 8, 501 P.2d at 206
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This basic principle is also recognized in the APA, which does not
require exhaustion when "review of the final agency action would not
provide an adequate remedy."4 2 Examples of preliminary agency
actions that would not be subject to the exhaustion requirement
include denials of motions to intervene or of requests for subpoenas.
c. Sections 67-5270, 67-5721, and Finality
A requirement that is closely related to exhaustion 'of
administrative remedies is the general requirement that the agency
action must be "final" before review is available.4"3 The essential
idea of "finality" is simply stated in the APA: in creating the
entitlement to judicial review of agency actions, the Act specifies that
"[a] person aggrieved by .final agency action... [and a] party
aggrieved by a final agency order.., is entitled to judicial
review."4°4 The reason for the requirement of a final agency action
is also simple: it is the conclusion of the proceedings that is
important since many preliminary problems may be mooted by the
agency's final decision.
Finality is only infrequently an issue since it generally will be
apparent when the agency decision is only a preliminary decision. 40 5
Sometimes, however, that is not the case. For example, in South Fork
Coalition v. Board of Commissioners,4"8 the Coalition appealed a
county commission decision to approve in principle the construction
of a planned unit development in a zone designated for grazing. 40 7
Petitioner argued that a residential development was inconsistent
with the zone.' The supreme court remanded the decisi6n to the
(1972) (agency regulations not available as required); Bohemian Breweries, 80 Idaho
at 446, 332 P.2d at 879-90 (agency facially violating applicable statute).
402. § 67-5271(2).
403. § 67-5270(2)-(3).
404. Id. See 2 COOPER, supra note 177, at 572-85, 588-95; STRAUSS, supra
note 376, at 229-32.
405. The Attorney General's Rules further clarify the issue by requiring the
finality of orders to be explicitly stated. See IRAP 720.02.a (notice required
includes statement that a recommended order "will not become final without action
of the agency head"); 730.02.a (notice required includes statement that a
preliminary order "will become final without further action . . . unless any party
petitions for reconsideration ... or appeals"); 740.02.a-.b (notice required includes
statement that the order is a "final order" and that a party may appeal to district
court); see also IRAP 750 (procedure for resolving orders not designated by the
agency as recommended, preliminary, or final order).
406. 112 Idaho 89, 730 P.2d 1009 (1986).
407. Id. at 90, 730 P.2d at 1010 (Shepard, J., dissenting).
408. Id. at 91, 730 P.2d at 1011 (Shepard, J., dissenting).
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commission because "approval in principle" was only a preliminary
step to submission of a final development plan.4"9 As such it was
not a final agency action subject to judicial review - even though the
commission was unlikely to revisit its decision that a PUD was
consistent with the zone.
Perhaps the most common situation in which finality issues
arise is when an agency refuses or fails to act. When an agency is
sued on the grounds that a statute requires it to do something, the
most common response is that it has not as yet completed
consideration of the matter and that there is, therefore, no final
agency action to review.41 ' The obvious dilemma is that inaction at
some point effectively becomes a decision to deny. If there is to be
meaningful judicial review of agency decisions, finality defenses must
be set aside at some point. The APA recognizes this problem by
specifically defining "agency action" to include "the failure to issue a
rule or order.., or failure to perform, any duty placed on [the
agency] by law."11
d. Section 67-5278: Ripeness and the Availability of Declaratory
Judgments on Rules
"Ripeness" is the timing doctrine that shares many attributes
with standing: both seek to avoid litigation of abstract issues by
withholding judicial review until the actual effects of an agency
decision are known. Ripeness also overlaps with the federal
constitutional requirements that litigation involve a "case or
controversy" since the doctrine seeks to prevent the adjudication of
abstract ideas by requiring concrete injury.4 2  As such, the
applicability of the ripeness doctrine should be carefully scrutinized
by the Idaho Supreme Court to determine whether the doctrine is in
fact applicable in a court system of general jurisdiction.
The potential applicability of the doctrine to judicial review of
agency action in Idaho is substantially reduced by the provisions of §
67-5278 authorizing the use of declaratory judgment actions to
determine the "validity or applicability of a rule."413 Any person
409. Id. a't 90, 730 P.2d at 1010 (Shepard, J., dissenting).
410. E.g., Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 104
Idaho 628, 629, 661 P.2d 1227, 1228 (1983) (per curiam).
411. § 67-5201(3)(b)-(c). As with exhaustion, the finality requirement is also
limited by the APA's provision allowing review of preliminary agency actions when
"review of the final agency action would not provide an adequate remedy." § 67-
5271(2).
412. E.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
American Trucking Ass'n v. ICC, 747 F.2d 787, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
413. § 67-5278(1). The section requires the agency to be made a party to the
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may petition the district court for declaratory judgment on the
validity or applicability of an agency rule that threatens to interfere
with the legal rights or privileges of the petitioning party.414 Since
ripeness is most frequently an issue in cases involving pre-
enforcement challenges to rules, the APA overrides much of the
federal doctrine's traditional scope.
To the extent that ripeness remains a potentially viable limit on
judicial review of agency action, the Idaho case law suggests a two-
part test: whether the issues presented are suitable. for judicial
resolution without the additional facts that would be available if
adjudication were delayed and whether delay will itself be beneficial
or detrimental. In Miles v. Idaho Power Co.," the district court
dismissed petitioner's challenge to the constitutionality of the Swan
Falls agreement on the ground that it was not ripe,416 concluding
that petitioner would suffer no harm until the public utilities
commission acted on the agreement.417 Since the actions of the
commission were unknown, the case lacked the concreteness the
court felt necessary to resolve the issues presented by the
petition.4"8 The supreme court disagreed, noting that "[dleferring
adjudication would add nothing material to the resolution of the legal
issues presented, and it would, in fact, delay implementation of the
agreement."4 9
action. § 67-5278(2).
414. § 67-5278(1).
415. 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989).
416. Id. at 637, 778 P.2d at 759.
417. Id. at 642-43, 778 P.2d at 764-65.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 643, 778 P.2d at 765; see also Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., Inc. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 104 Idaho 628, 629, 661 P.2d 1227, 1228 (1983) (per
curiam) (agency policy statement arguably not ripe for review because its impact
was uncertain).
In the federal courts, the question is whether the issues presented are "fit"
for judicial determination - are they predominately legal or are additional facts
necessary to flesh out the controversy? - and will delay impose "hardship" on the
parties? See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); 2 COOPER,
supra note 177, at 588; SCHWARTZ, supra note 371, at § 9.1; STRAUSS, supra note
376, at 233-34.
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C. The How, When, Where, and What of Judicial Review
1. Section 67-5272: Form of Review
The APA explicitly authorizes two forms of review: a petition for
review and a declaratory judgment.42 The Act is not intended to
preclude other forms of review such as the common law prerogative
writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.2
2. Sections 67-5273 and 67-5274: Time for Filing Petition for
Judicial Review and Stays of Agency Action
The time for filing a petition for review varies with the nature of
the agency action that is to be reviewed.
A petition for review of the substance of a final rule may be filed
at any time.422 Procedural challenges to final rules, however, must
be filed within two years of their effective date.4"
A petition for review of an order must be filed within twenty-
eight days of the issuance of the order or twenty-eight days after the
decision on reconsideration of the order.4 A cross-petition for
judicial review may be filed within fourteen days after a party is
served with a copy of the notice and petition for review.425 The
provision for cross-petitions is an important improvement; the old
APA had no provision for responses to a petition. As a result, a party
could wait until the last minute of the last day to petition for review.
If the statute were strictly construed, all other parties would lose
their right to cross-appeal because cross-petitions could not be filed in
time.
420. § 67-5272.
421. While the utility and limits of these writs are beyond the scope of this
article, it is important to note that the state courts - as courts of general
jurisdiction - are the lineal descendants of the English common law courts. This
includes the supervisory powers that the King's Bench exercised through the
prerogative writs. See 2 COOPER, supra note 177, at 644-62.
422. § 67-5273(1); cf Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 102 Idaho
744, 749, 639 P.2d 442, 447 (1981) (failing to exhaust administrative remedies does
not preclude subsequent attack on rulemaking).
423. See § 67-5273(1). Section 67-5231(2) imposes a two-year statute of
limitations on challenges to the procedural regularity of a rulemaking. See
generally supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing penalty for
noncompliance with APA's procedural requirements).
424. § 67-5273(2). On petitions for reconsideration, see §§ 67-5243(3), -5246(4);
see also supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text (discussing petitions for
reconsideration).
425. § 67-5273(2).
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A petition for judicial review of agency action that is neither a
rule nor an order must be filed within twenty-eight days of the
agency action.42 The time for filing a petition for judicial review is
tolled during the petitioner's attempts to exhaust administrative
remedies as long as the attempts are clearly not frivolous or
repetitious.427  Cross-petitions for review may be filed within
fourteen days of the filing of a petition for review.4
Although filing a petition for judicial review does not in and of
itself stay the effectiveness or enforcement of the agency action,
either the agency or the reviewing court may grant a stay.42 There
are good reasons not to provide -an automatic stay upon the filing of a
petition for review. Some agency actions such as the seizure of
adulterated food4 ° or the quarantine of diseased animals4"' are
taken to protect the public health. If a person subject to such an
order could stay the order simply by filing a petition for judicial
review, the person would be able effectively to lift the seizure or
quarantine, and there would be no way to protect the public health.
Therefore, instead of an automatic stay of an agency action, each
petition for a stay must be individually determined.
3. Section 67-5272: Venue
Once it has been determined that judicial review is available,
the next question is: where? The APA has very broad venue
provisions. Petitions for judicial review of all agency actions and
petitions for declaratory rulings on validity or applicability of agency
rules may be filed in the district court in one of up to four locations:
the county in which the hearing was held, the county in which final
agency action was taken, the county in which the aggrieved party
resides, or the county in which the real or personal property that was
the subject of the agency's action is located.4 2
There should be few problems in determining venue.
Furthermore, given the purposes of the Act, the venue provisions
should be liberally construed. For example, where hearings may be
recessed and held in more than one county, any county in which a
426. § 67-5273(3).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. § 67-5274; see also IRAP 780 (stays of orders).
430. § 37-118(d).
431. § 25-307.
432. § 67-5272; see also IRAP 791.01 (locations where parties may obtain
judicial review); IRAP 860.01 (locations where persons may obtain judicial review).
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hearing was held should be proper venue. The county in which final
agency action is taken is not necessarily the county in which the
agency's main office is located. Generally the county in which the
record of the final agency action is filed is the county in which the
final agency action was taken.
4. Sections 67-5225, 67-5249, 67-5275, and 67-5276:
Agency Record for Judicial Review
The APA specifies in detail what is to be included in the agency
record for review of the three enumerated types of "agency action":
rules, orders, and statutorily imposed duties.4" It also allows the
agency record to be supplemented after the conclusion of the hearing
before the agency in a very limited range of situations.434
The agency record must be transmitted to the reviewing court
within forty-two days after the court receives the petition for judicial
review.4"5 The parties may stipulate to an abbreviated record; a
party unreasonably refusing to so stipulate may be taxed by the court
for the additional costs.43
a. Sections 67-5225 and 67-5275: The Record for Judicial
Review of Rulemaking
In conjunction with the rulemaking procedures, the agency is
required to compile a "rulemaking record"437 that is to be the
agency record for judicial review.438 The record must include public
comments, written materials relied upon by the agency, and any
materials prepared in conjunction with the rulemaking. 39 While
the Act specifically provides that this record "need not constitute the
exclusive basis" for the agency's decision or for judicial review of that
decision,44 requiring the agency to prepare the record does increase
the procedural formality of the rulemaking process. It is also
intended to improve judicial review of agency decisionmaking by
increasing the information necessarily presented to reviewing courts.
433. § 67-5201(3).
434. § 67-5276. The court may also require corrections to the record. § 67-
5275(3).
435. § 67-5275(1).
436. § 67-5275(2).
437. § 67-5225.
438. § 67-5275(1)(a).
439. § 67-5225(2).
440. § 67-5225(3) & cmt. 3.
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b. Sections 67-5249 and 67-5275: The Record for Judicial
Review of Contested Cases
While the creation of a rulemaking record for judicial review
marks a potentially significant change in administrative procedures,
the record that must be created in the course of a contested case -
and that is to be the exclusive basis for agency factfinding in such
decisions"' - is a familiar requirement. The record must include
all notices of proceedings, pleadings, motions, briefs, petitions, and
intermediate rulings; evidence received or considered; a statement of
matters officially noticed; offers of proof and objections and rulings;
the record prepared by the presiding officer and any transcript of the
record; staff memoranda or data submitted to the presiding officer or
the agency having connection with the consideration of the
proceeding; and any recommended order, preliminary order, final
order, or order on reconsideration.442
c. Section 67-5275: The Agency Record for Judicial Review
of Other Agency Actions
To facilitate judicial review of agency actions other than rules
and orders, the agency record for such appeals shall include "any
agency documents expressing the agency action."443 This minimal
statutory requirement reflects the variety of decisions encompassed
within this category of agency actions and the difficulty in specifying
what types of documents will be produced in conjunction with such a
variety of decisions. Presumably, the record may include letters,
memoranda, and other pre-decisional and all decision documents.
Agencies should be careful to document the basis for their decisions.
As the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized,
441. § 67-5248(2); see also § 67-5249(3) & cmt.; § 67-5279(3).
442. § 67-5249(2). The APA specifies that this record is to be the "agency
record for judicial review" of the order. § 67-5275(1)(b). In addition to these
statutory requirements, the court has specified in some detail what the record
must include. One of the crucial functions that must be performed in reaching a
decision is fact-finding. Vernon v. Omark Indus., 113 Idaho 358, 359-60, 744 P.2d
86, 87-88 (1987); see also Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104
Idaho 32, 37, 655 P.2d 926, 931 (1982); Ellison v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 317,
319, 528 P.2d 199, 201 (1974); Nenoff v. Culligan Soft Water, 95 Idaho 834, 836,
521 P.2d 658, 660 (1974). The agency must also provide a reasoned explanation for
discretionary decisions. E.g., Davidson v. H. H. Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 759-60,
718 P.2d 1196, 1197-98 (1986).
443. § 67-5275(1)(c).
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[t]o abide the notion that the Commission's order was based
upon reasoned findings of fact would be treacherous to say the
least. The findings were generated after the order in an
attempt to justify the earlier conclusions. Findings which are
created after a decision has been made and entered are not
the "findings"
required by the APA since it is a basic rule of administrative law
that post hoc rationalizations and litigation memoranda are entitled
to far less deference than are contemporaneous records of the reasons
for a decision."'
d. Section 67-5276: Supplementing the Agency Record
Ordinarily, the record on review is the record that was prepared
by the agency during the course of its decisionmaking. Under two
narrow circumstances, however, the reviewing court can order the
agency record to be supplemented. The person seeking to supplement
the record must petition the court for permission to present the
additional evidence. If it is demonstrated to the court's satisfaction
that the evidence is material, the court may order that the evidence
be admitted under one of two procedures.
First, if there were good reasons for failure to present the
evidence in the proceeding before the agency, the court can remand
the matter to the agency to conduct additional factfinding."5 This
procedure is intended to cover situations in which the reason for the
failure to present the evidence is traceable to some excusable conduct
of the petitioner. In such situations, there are at least three reasons
why the matter should be returned to the agency. First, it recognizes
the importance of the agency's expertise. If the evidence is material
to the decision, the agency should have the first opportunity to
evaluate the additional evidence and to modify its decision if the
additional evidence warrants."6 Second, a remand to allow the
agency to evaluate the evidence also means that the court will have
the benefit of the agency's reasoning and examination of the evidence
in reviewing the agency's subsequent order. Third, it conserves
judicial resources. If the court were to hear the additional evidence
444. Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho __, 864 P.2d 132, 136-37 (1993); see also
'Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971); Van
Heukelom v. Pine Crest Psychiatric Ctr., 106 Idaho 898, 899-900, 684 P.2d 300,
301-02 (1984).
445. § 67-5276(1)(a).
446. § 67-5276(2).
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and to determine that the evidence should significantly affect the
agency's decision, the court would be required to remand the matter
to the agency; remanding after a threshold showing of materiality
and good cause avoids the more lengthy procedures.
Second, if it is alleged that there were procedural irregularities
before the agency, the court may hear evidence on the allega-
tions.447 This procedure is intended to cover those situations in
which a party's failure to present the evidence is traceable to the
agency's handling of the hearing. In such cases, the court should
determine whether there were procedural irregularities and whether
they rendered the agency's decision insufficiently supported. The
court is not, however, empowered to hear the case de novo." The
authority to take evidence on procedural irregularities serves as a
valuable safeguard against the potential abuse of the administrative
process.
D. Scope of Review: Sections 67-5277 to 67-5279
Judicial review of an agency action is an appellate function.
Baldly stated, the court's role is to review the record created before
the agency and determine whether the agency's decision was both
reasonable and sufficiently explained. Before examining the scope of
review to be applied to the various issues before a reviewing court, it
is helpful to briefly examine the general principles applicable to
judicial review of agency actions.
The central principle of judicial review of agency actions is that
it is an appellate process." 9 As such, judicial review is conducted by
447. § 67-5276(1)(b).
448. It is important to note that the scope of review in such cases is not
changed by the presence of procedural irregularities. The APA explicitly includes a
harmless error principle: "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights
of the appellant have been prejudiced." § 67-5279(4). Thus, if the agency's decision
is still reasonable despite the procedural irregularities and the additional evidence,
it should be affirmed by the reviewing court. Nor does the conclusion that the
decision is unreasonable in light of the procedural irregularities and the additional
evidence change the court's role in the overall decisionmaking process: if the court
concludes that the decision is not supported by the evidence, the court is to
remand to the agency for additional action. See University of Utah Hosp. v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 113 Idaho 441, 446, 745 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Ct. App. 1987) (the
existence of procedural irregularities does not allow the court to try the case de
novo).
449. This fundamental point concerning the nature of judicial review is
buttressed by provisions in three sections of the APA: § 67-5276, which requires
the court to remand to the agency to take additional evidence on issues other than
procedural irregularities in the agency's decision; § 67-5277, which specifies that
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the court without a jury.45 ° Similarly, review of disputed issues of
fact is not a de novo proceeding, but is to be confined to the record
created by the agency.41 Thus, the court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on a
question of fact.452 Furthermore, if the reviewing court concludes
that the agency's decision lacks sufficient support as a matter of law,
the court is to set aside and remand the decision to the agency.
45
A second important principle is that judicial review under the
APA begins with a presumption of regularity: "the court shall affirm
"454the agency action unless the court finds that the action was ....
Thus, to reverse the agency decision the reviewing court is required
to conclude that the decision was
"(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
"(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
"(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
judicial review is to be conducted without a jury and is to be based on the record
prepared by the agency; and § 67-5279, which specifies that the court is not to
reweigh the evidence on questions of fact.
450. § 67-5277. There is no constitutional right to a trial by jury in an
administrative proceeding. See, e.g., Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, 750-51, 242 P.
314, 315 (1925).
451. § 67-5277. "De novo review" is an oxymoron since it is not review but
retrial and redetermination. There is no right to a de novo trial upon appeal from
an administrative decision. E.g., Hill v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 850,
852, 623 P.2d 462, 464 (1981); Brady, 41 Idaho at 750-51, 242 P. at 315;
University of Utah Hosp., 113 Idaho at 446, 745 P.2d at 1067. The legislature
may, of course, require de novo factfinding upon appeal from an agency decision.
See Hart v. Stewart, 95 Idaho 781, 784, 519 P.2d 1171, 1174 (1974); Knight v.
Department of Ins., 119 Idaho 591, 593, 808 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Ct. App. 1991).
452. § 67-5279(1).
453. § 67-5279(2)-(3); cf. Swisher v. State Dep't of Envtl. & Community Servs.,
98 Idaho 565, 567 n.1, 569 P.2d 910, 912 n.1 (1977) ("[Wlhen [a] statute provides
that on appeal from [an agency] the district court may only affirm or set aside
orders of the [agency] or remand the matter to the [agency], the district court has
no jurisdiction to enter any other orders or take further evidence on matters not
considered by the [agency].").
454. § 67-5279(2) (emphasis added). The provision covering record-based
decisions is in essence identical: "[T]he court shall affirm the agency action unless
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions
are . . . ." § 67-5279(3) (emphasis added). The presumption of regularity that is
codified in these APA provisions reflects the prior case law. E.g., Horner v.
Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985) ("In
Idaho, as in most states, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties," so the court will "presume that the Commission reviewed the
tape recording of the hearing along with the rest of the record in reaching its
decision" and the lack of a transcript was an insufficient basis to increase the
rigor of the judicial review.).
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"(d) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."45 '
The APA thus sets out a hierarchy of decisions for the reviewing
court,45 beginning with the question of whether the agency acted
within the scope of its constitutional and statutory authority. This
inquiry must begin with a determination of that authority and the
concomitant scope of the discretion accorded to the agency by the
constitutional or statutory provisions at issue.
If the agency's action was constitutional and legal, the court
must then determine if it followed the proper procedure in taking the
challenged action."7 This requires a determination of the nature of
the agency action as either an adjudicatory, record-based decision or
a legislative, not-record-based decision; the procedural requirements
imposed upon such actions by either the specific statute or the APA;
and whether the agency has complied with those requirements.
Next the court is required to determine whether the factual
bases of the agency's action satisfy the applicable scope of review.458
The standard to be applied varies with the nature of the agency
action. If the decision is legislative, that is, if it is not required to be
made solely on the basis of a record compiled at an evidentiary
hearing, the question is whether the agency's findings of fact are
"arbitrary or capricious."459 On the other hand, if the decision is
adjudicative, that is, if it is required to be made on the record, the
question is whether the agency's findings are "supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole."4"
Finally, the court must determine whether the agency's exercise
of any discretion accorded to it was "arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion."46 '
As this hierarchy of decisions demonstrates, one distinction is
central to an understanding of judicial review of agency actions. This
is the APA's division of agency actions into two categories: those that
455. § 67-5279(2). It is important to note that the standards applicable to
record-based decisions are identical to those applicable to not-record-based decisions
with the addition of "not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole." § 67-5279(3)(d). The distinction between review of factual decisions in
record-based and not-record-based decisions is discussed at notes 475-84 and
accompanying text infra (discussing judicial review of agency factfinding).
456. Cf Morgan v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 6, 8-9, 813
P.2d 345, 347-48 (1991) (discussing judicial review of agency action under former
APA).
457. See § 67-5279(2)(c), (3)(c).
458. See § 67-5279(2)(d), (3)(d).
459. § 67-5279(2)(d).
460. § 67-5279(3)(d).
461. See § 67-5279(2)(d), (3)(e).
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are required to be made on the record and those that are not. Under
the APA itself, orders are the only type of agency action required to
be made "on the record."462 The distinction between record-based
adjudicative decisions and not-record-based legislative decisions
determines the scope of review of the factfinding function. Fact-
finding in an adjudicative decision is reviewed under the "substantial
evidence on the record as a whole" standard.4" Factfinding in a
legislative decision is based on the "arbitrary [or] capricious"
standard.4"
1 1. Judicial Review and the Law-Declaring Function
For both an adjudicative (record-based) and a legislative (not-
record-based) agency action, the court is to determine whether the
agency action was "in violation of constitutional or statutory provi-
sions .... in excess of the statutory authority of the agency [or] made
upon unlawful procedure."465 This requires the court to determine
de novo whether the agency's action was unconstitutional, or sub-
462. An order "must be based exclusively on the evidence in the record." § 67-
5248(2); see also §§ 67-5249(3) & cmt., -5279(3) (requiring contested cases to be
decided solely on the basis of the record compiled before the agency). The
rulemaking record, on the other hand, "need not constitute the exclusive basis" for
the agency's decision. § 67-5225(3) & cmt. 3. See generally § 67-5279 cmt. 1
(distinguishing between record-based and not-record-based decisions). The
legislature might, of course, choose to require an agency to make a legislative
decision based on the procedure required in a contested case. It apparently has not
done so and there is ample reason to hope that it never will do so. See Robert W.
Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEX.
L. REV. 1132, 1143-45 (1972) (FDA proceeding to determine whether peanut butter
should be 87% or 90% peanuts produced a transcript of 7,736 pages).
463. § 67-5279(3)(d).
464. § 67-5279(2)(d).
465. § 67-5279(2)(a)-(c) (not-record-based decisions); § 67-5279(3)(a)-(c) (record-
based decisions). It is important to note that the question of whether the agency's
decision was "made upon unlawful procedure" is a question of law. The correct
judicial response to decisions "made upon unlawful procedure" is to remand to the
agency to correct its procedural error. As the court noted in Shokal, "we can
define no substantive error to date on the part of Water Resources. Thus, while
reversal of the agency is inappropriate, the amended application is properly
remanded for a new hearing to correct the procedural error." Shokal v. Dunn, 109
Idaho 330, 334, 707 P.2d 441, 445 (1985) (emphasis added). The crucial point is
that a protestant is entitled to remand for a new hearing for procedural errors
even when no substantive errors have been shown because it is through the
hearing that the protestant has the opportunity to demonstrate that the agency's
action has substantive problems. See also Holly Care Ctr. v. State Dep't of
Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 78-79, 714 P.2d 45, 47-48 (1986) (agency choice of rule
making rather than contested case procedure reversed).
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stantively or procedurally ultra vires. If the reviewing court concludes
that the agency's interpretation of the statute led it to act illegally,
the court is to reverse and remand that decision to the agency for
appropriate action.
It is important to distinguish these questions from another
recurrent situation that arises from an agency's interpretation of a
statute: to the extent that the statute accords the agency discretion,
the issue increasingly becomes one of exercising the discretion
granted to the agency by the legislature. Such discretionary decisions
are reviewed under the "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion" standard.4"
The traditional analysis of "questions of law" tends to conflate
these two separate and sequential functions. Separating them can
help to clarify the process of judicial review by shifting the focus:
while the court's law-declaring function requires it first to determine
de novo if the agency interpretation is "in violation of... statutory
provisions [or] excess of... statutory authority,"467 once it has
determined that the agency's interpretation is not illegal, the
applicable scope of review then becomes whether the agency's
decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."4
The distinction can be highlighted by comparing three possible
cases. In the first, the reviewing court determines that the agency
misconstrued the applicable statute and that it did not, therefore,
have the authority to take the action that it took; the court reverses
and remands to the agency to take appropriate action under the
correct interpretation of the statute.4"9 On the other hand, when the
466. § 67-5279(2)(d) (not-record-based decisions); § 67-5279(3)(e) (record-based
decisions); see, e.g., J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849,
853-55, 820 P.2d 1206, 1210-12 (1991); Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 163, 595
P.2d 309, 312 (1979); Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. V-1 Oil Co., 90 Idaho 415, 420,
412 P.2d 581, 586 (1966).
467. § 67-5279(2)(a)-(b) (not-record-based decisions); § 67-5279(3)(a)-(b) (record-
based decisions).
468. § 67-5279(2)(d) (not-record-based decisions); § 67-5279(3)(e) (record-based
decisions).
469. This was the situation in Pumice Prods., Inc. v. Robison, 79 Idaho 144,
312 P.2d 1026 (1957). The statute specified that the Commission of Labor "shall,
when a question arises concerning representation of employees in a collective
bargaining unit and when requested to do so by any employer or employees, deter-
mine the representatives thereof by taking a secret ballot of employees." Id. at
147, 312 P.2d at 1027. The Commissioner refused to hold an election despite a
request from the employees of Pumice Products, relying upon a regulation he had
promulgated that prohibited the holding of more than one election for a bargaining
unit in any twelve month period. Id. at 146, 312 P.2d at 1027. The court, how-
ever, concluded that the statute was "plain and unambiguous . . . and does not
[Vol. 30
A PRIMER FOR THE PRACTITIONER
reviewing court determines that the agency's interpretation of the
statute is permissible,47 it must also determine whether the
agency's exercise of the implicitly delegated discretion was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. There are two possible conclu-
sions to this second question: the agency either was or was not
reasonable.47" '
confer on the Commissioner of Labor any right to make a regulation or ruling in
direct conflict with its terms." Id. at 147, 312 P.2d at 1027; see also Idaho Fair
Share v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 113 Idaho 959, 961-62, 751 P.2d 107, 109-10
(1988); Ware v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 98 Idaho 477, 480-81, 567 P.2d 423,
425-26 (1977); Idaho Compensation Co. v. Hubbard, 70 Idaho 59, 62-63, 211 P.2d
413, 415 (1949).
470. The point can be stated either as one involving an ambiguous statute or
as one involving the delegation of discretion to the agency. For example, if the
statute is not ambiguous, the agency is required to comply with it. See, e.g.,
Hubbard, 70 Idaho 59, 62, 211 P.2d 413, 415. On the other hand, if the statute is
ambiguous, the issue is whether the agency resolved the ambiguity in a reasonable
way. See, e.g., Kopp, 100 Idaho 160, 163, 595 P.2d 309, 312.
471. In Kopp, the statute provided: "[Tihe number of [liquor] licenses...
issued for any city shall not exceed one (1) license for each one thousand five
hundred (1,500) of population of said city . . . as established in the last preceding
census, or any subsequent special census conducted by the United States bureau of
the census." 100 Idaho at 162, 595 P.2d at 311. The agency interpreted the statute
to allow retail liquor licenses to be issued on the basis of current population data
from the census bureau. Id. A city resident challenged the issuance of an
additional license based on a census bureau population estimate that was used by
the federal government for revenue sharing purposes. Id. The resident argued that
the term "special census" was defined by a federal statute that authorized local
governments to purchase "special censuses" from the bureau. Id. at 164, 166, 595
P.2d at 313, 315. The court concluded that the statute was subject to varying
interpretations and, given the deference to be accorded to an administrative
construction of a statute, held that the agency's interpretation was a permissible
one. Id. at 163, 595 P.2d at 312; see also Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. V-1 Oil Co.,
90 Idaho 415, 420, 412 P.2d 581, 586 (1966); McCall v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 69
Idaho 410, 413, 208 P.2d 799, 801 (1949).
Holly Care Ctr. v. State Dep't of Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 714 P.2d 45
(1986), can be understood as presenting the third alternative. The employer was
late in paying its unemployment compensation tax and failed to include a tax
increase in its payment when finally made. Id. at 77, 714 P.2d at 46. As a result,
the employer was more than $300 delinquent. Id. The Department imposed a
penalty on the employer under a statute which provided in part that
"delinquencies of a minor nature may be disregarded if a showing is made . . .
that such covered employer has acted in good faith and that [the penalty] would
be inequitable." Id. at 77 n.1, 714 P.2d at 46 n.1. The Department relied on a
previously adopted rule specifying that delinquencies greater than $20 were per se
not "minor." Id. at 78, 714 P.2d at 47. The court reviewed the statute and
concluded that, while it did grant the agency discretion to determine what was
"minor," the agency's decision to define all delinquencies over $20 as not-minor
was arbitrary. Id. at 79, 714 P.2d at 48.
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In each of these situations, the court is required independently
to construe the statute -to declare the law - to determine whether
the agency's action was within the authority the statute conferred on
it. In the first situation, the court construed the statute and
concluded that it was inconsistent with the agency's interpretation;
the agency action therefore was ultra vires.472 In the second
situation, the court concluded that the statute was subject to
differing interpretations and that the agency's resolution of the
uncertainty was both permissible and reasonable.473 In the third
case, the court concluded that, while the statute was subject to
differing interpretations, the agency's interpretation was
unreasonable.4 74
2. Judicial Review of Factfinding
The distinction between adjudicative (record-based) and
legislative (not-record-based) decisions is important in determining
the standard to be applied, to agency factfinding. While judicial
review of the factual predicates of adjudicative decisions employs the
"substantial evidence" standard,47 judicial review of the factual
bases of legislative decisions employs the "arbitrary or capricious"
standard.47
Judicial review of adjudicative decisions requires the court to
affirm the agency's factfinding unless it is "not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole."477 The thousands of
words that are written annually on the meaning of "substantial
evidence" may actually do more to confuse than to clarify. The best
that can be hoped for is some corralling of the idea:47 substantial
evidence means more than a mere scintilla, more than simply some
472. E.g., Pumice Prods., 79 Idaho at 147, 312 P.2d at 1027.
473. E.g., Kopp, 100 Idaho at 162, 595 P.2d at 311.
474. E.g., Holly Care Ctr., 110 Idaho at 79, 714 P.2d at 48.
475. § 67-5279(3)(d).
476. § 67-5279(2)(d).
477. § 67-5279(3)(d).
478. The leading Idaho cases on the topic are: Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581,
588-89, 726 P.2d 693, 700-01 (1986); Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110
Idaho 257, 260-61, 715 P.2d 927, 930-31 (1986); Local 1494 of Intl Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 633-35, 586 P.2d 1346, 1349-51
(1978). The most extended discussion of the same language by the United States
Supreme Court is in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
Universal Camera has been cited with approval in several Idaho cases. E.g.,
Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho at 260-61, 715 P.2d at 930-31; Firefighters, 99 Idaho at 633-
35, 586 P.2d at 1349-51; see also § 67-5279 cmt. 4 (citing Universal Camera, 340
U.S. at 485).
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evidence supporting the agency's decision. It does not mean, however,
that the court is to engage in a de novo review or to substitute its
judgment on the weight of the evidence for that of the agency. The
standard has been likened to that applicable to motions for a directed
verdict: if the evidence in the record would support a refusal to direct
a verdict in a jury trial, the evidence is "substantial." Thus - to say
the same thing yet again - the standard requires the reviewing
court to consider all of the record and to determine on the basis of
that record whether the agency's factfinding is reasonable.
The standard used to evaluate legislative actions is whether the
agency's factual conclusions are "arbitrary or capricious."479 This
requires the agency to "examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation" for its factfinding.' In short, the court is
to examine the information before the agency and the explanations
that the agency provides to determine whether there is a rational
* relationship between the evidence and the facts found.
479. § 67-5279(2)(d). The substantial evidence standard is inapplicable to such
agency actions because they are not required to be made "on the record."
480. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983). Because the old APA provided for judicial review of only contested
cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has only infrequently examined the arbitrary,
capricious, or abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., In re Intermountain Gas Co.,
77 Idaho 188, 200, 289 P.2d 933, 941 (1955) (reversing agency approval of a plan
for distributing natural gas because it "rests upon speculation as to future
possibilities"). The court has, however, addressed related issues in other contexts.
The court, for'example, has required the agency to specify the basis for its factual
conclusions:
We cannot ascertain whether the commission simply did not believe the
testimony of the claimant's doctors or her own testimony, or placed
greater weight on the conflicting evidence, or believed the claimant's
testimony, but applied a rule of law to reach its determination. It is not
our function to guess the reasoning of the commission . . . . To aid in
appellate review, the commission must, when faced with contrasting
factual allegations, find the facts, based upon the evidence it believes to
be more credible. Here, the commission simply recited the conflicting
evidence presented without resolving the factual conflicts. In short, the
commission's findings and conclusions of law are incomplete and need to
be expanded before we can properly exercise our appellate review function.
Vernon v. Omark Indus., 113 Idaho 358, 360, 744 P.2d 86, 88 (1987); see also
Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 37, 655 P.2d
926, 931 (1982); Ellison v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 317, 319, 528 P.2d 199, 201
(1974); Nenoff v. Culligan Soft Water, 95 Idaho 834, 836, 521 P.2d 658, 660
(1974). Similarly, the court has required the agency to explain its discretionary
decisions. E.g., Davidson v. H. H. Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 759-60, 718 P.2d 1196,
1197-98 (1986). Requirements for such explanations are now applicable to
legislative as well as adjudicative decisions.
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In addition to employing different standards of review, those
standards are applied to different bodies of data. The "record" that is
available to the reviewing court is significantly different in the two
types of agency actions.48'
In reviewing adjudicative decisions, the court has a record that
is to be the sole basis for the agency's factfinding; the reviewing court
is required to subject that record to searching scrutiny to determine
whether is provides substantial support for the agency's decision.4"2
In reviewing legislative decisions, on the other hand, the record
available to the reviewing "need not constitute the exclusive basis for
agency action ... or for judicial review thereof;"4 3 the issue in such
cases is whether the agency has articulated a rational basis for its
decision.4
3. Judicial Review of Judgment and Discretion
The problems involved in reviewing agency judgments and
discretion are perhaps the most challenging aspect of judicial review:
481. The significant difference between the review of the two types of
decisions is the nature of the "record." As then-judge Scalia noted,
When the arbitrary or capricious standard is performing the function of
assuring factual support, there is no substantive difference between what
it requires and what would be required by the substantial evidence test,
since it is impossible to conceive of a "non-arbitrary" factual judgment
supported only by evidence that is not substantial . . . . [T]he distinction
between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test
is "largely semantic" . . . . The distinctive function [of the substantial
evidence standard] is to require substantial evidence to be found within
the record of the closed-record proceedings to which it exclusively applies.
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also supra notes 192-96 and
accompanying text (discussing differences in scope of judicial review of agency
legislative and adjudicatory decisions).
482. See, e.g., Department of Health & Welfare v. Sandoval, 113 Idaho 186,
190, 742 P.2d 992, 996 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[Wihere credibility is crucial and where
first-hand exposure to the witness may strongly affect the outcome, we think the
[agency head] should not override the [presiding] officer's impressions unless it
makes a cogent explanation of its reasons for doing so. Such an explanation is
essential to meaningful judicial review, and it is a logical adjunct to the [agency
head's] statutory duty to supplement its decisions with findings of fact and
conclusions of law.").
483. § 67-5225(3).
484. Cf Rhodes v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Idaho Sup. Ct. Rep. 1417, 1418
(1993) (the issue is whether there is a "rational relationship" between the agency's
statutory mandate and the regulations adopted).
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On the one hand, court action must respect the statutory
assignment of responsibility. The agency, not the court, has
been directed to make judgments about whether a given road
should be built, . . . or environmental protection rule adopted.
Assuring that respect is not a simple task, since judges
commonly share the passions of their community on such
matters. On the other hand, the agencies' responsibility is
intended to be constrained by procedures, by substantive law,
by expectations of rationality and openness. Assuring the
success of those constraints is a judicial task.' 5
The scope of review for exercises of judgment and discretion is
whether the decision was "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion." 8 Part of this question was noted in the context of the
law-declaring function: the court is required to declare what the law
is and to determine whether the agency's decision is fairly within the
statutory confines. That is, was the judgment a permissible one? If
the decision was within the range of permissible decisions, it still
remains to be determined whether the decision was "arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion." This standard is often phrased
in the negative: an agency decision would be arbitrary, capricious or
an abuse of discretion if it were not based on those factors that the
legislature thought relevant, ignored an important aspect of the
problem, provided an explanation that ran counter to the evidence
before the agency, or involved a clear error in judgment.487 The
focus of this inquiry is on the methods by which the agency arrived
at its decision: for example, did the agency not only consider all the
right questions, did it consider some wrong ones? Does the relation-
ship between the facts found and the conclusion reached reveal gaps
in the logic of the reasoning process? Again, the question of judicial
review largely devolves into a question of whether the agency was
reasonable.'
485. STRAUSS, supra note 376, at 261.
486. § 67-5279(2)(d) (not-record-based decisions); § 67-5279(3)(e) (record-based
decisions).
487. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971).
488. As Kenneth Culp Davis concluded, "[Clourts usually substitute judgment
on the kinds of questions of law that are within their special competence, but on
other questions they limit themselves to deciding reasonableness; they do not
clarify the meaning of reasonableness but retain full discretion in each case to
stretch it in either direction." 5 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 29:1, at 332 (2d ed. 1984).
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Judicial review - be it of law-declaring, factfinding, law-
applying, or discretion-exercising acts by agencies - returns
repeatedly to the fundamental question of whether the agency action
was reasonable. In evaluating the law-declaring function the issue is
- at least once the agency's interpretation has been found to be a
permissible one - whether the agency's decision reasonably advances
the legislative goals.489 In reviewing the facts as found by the
agency the issue is the reasonableness of the inferences, credibility
evaluations, persuasive impact, and the like: did the agency
reasonably sift and weigh the information? In the law-applying and
discretion-exercising judgments the questions focus on the
reasonableness of the agency's decision processes and the reasons it
offers for its decisions.
E. Type of Relief: Section 67-5279
The relief available under the new APA differs from that
available under the old APA. Previously, the reviewing court was
authorized to "reverse or modify the decision of the agency." "
Under the new APA, on the other hand, "[i]f the agency action is not
affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or-in part, and remanded for
further proceedings as necessary."491 The reviewing court is no
longer authorized to modify the agency's decision: judicial review does
not shift decisionmaking from an agency to the court.
Finally, the APA has a "harmless error" rule.492 Unless the
agency's error affects a substantial right of the petitioner, the agency
action is to be affirmed.
V. LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF FINAL AGENCY RULES
The fifth part of the APA - §§ 67-5291 to 67-5292 - contains
the provisions on legislative review of agency regulations adopted in
compliance with the APA. The new APA leaves unchanged the
substantive provisions on this topic.
Section 67-5291 provides that the legislature may by concurrent
resolution' reject, amend, or modify final rules.493 The legislature's
489. E.g., Rhodes v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Idaho Sup. Ct. Rep. 1417, 1417-18
(1993); Holly Care Ctr. v. State Dep't of Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 78-79, 714
P.2d 45, 47-48 (1986).
490. Act of March 29, 1965, ch. 273, § 15(g), 1965 Idaho Sess. Laws 701, 711
(formerly codified § 67-5215(g)).
491. § 67-5279(2)-(3).
492. § 67-5279(4).
493. § 67-5291.
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constitutional power to exercise the authority to reject a previously
promulgated rule was upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court in Mead v.
Arnell.4 9 In Mead, the court explicitly reserved the question of the
validity of amending or modifying a rule by concurrent resolution.495
Section 67-5292 provides that all agency rules expire annually
on July 1 unless they are specifically extended by statute.4 9
494. 117 Idaho 660, 791 P.2d 410 (1990); see Phillip M. Barber, Mead v.
Arnell: The Legislative Veto and Too Much Separation of Powers, 27 IDAHO L. REV.
157 (1991); Dale D. Goble, Through the Looking-Glass and What the Idaho
Supreme Court Found There, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 81 (1990).
495. 117 Idaho at 668, 791 P.2d at 418.
496. § 67-5292.
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